Letters To The Editor 24/10/62

Cuban Crisis

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

  President Kennedy's analysis of the Cuban Crisis fails to deal with the tragic mis-understanding which lies behind the present international situation. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have prepared second strike forces to defend themselves against one another on the assumption that their opponent's "defensive" capability is actually an "offensive" one. This is the result of the Soviet Union's assumption that the "imperialist camp" is hostile by definition, thus helping to produce hostile behaviour toward the West and the West's defensive reaction to this hostility which in turn "proves" to the Soviet Union the accuracy of its prognosis.

     A missile is not "offensive" until it has been launched in a first strike against an opponent. Thus the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil are no more "offensive" than our IRBM's in Polaris submarines, Turkey or Italy. While both missile systems are probably genuinely defensive, they are both used to intimidate the opponent. Thus it is probable that the Soviet Union has no more intention of making a first strike from Cuba than the United States has of launching a first strike from Turkey.

  But in the same way that our IRBM's are used to remind the Soviet Union of the immediate consequences of any Soviet attack, so their missiles in Cuba are designed to remind us of the immediate consequences of any American attack.

  We know that we will not launch a first strike. but the Soviet Union cannot be sure because of the Soviet leadership assumption of imperialist hostility. The Soviet leader's know they will not launch such an attack, but the American leadership cannot be sure because of its assumption of Communist hostility. Therefore each side arms furiously to protect itself against an attack which will never be rationally decided upon.

  Would it be too unreasonable to offer to remove American IRBM's from the Soviet periphery in return for Soviet dismantling of its IRBMs in Cuba? Such a "deal" would retain the present "balance of terror" and might provide a more rational alternative to President Kennedy's strategy which provides Khrushchev with the ignoble alternatives of a humiliating retreat or the risks of running an armed blockade.

  It is most likely that the Soviet Union will stop sending IRBM's to Cuba for a while and allow the United States  Navy to search grain-filled holds for IRBM parts. Unfortunately, the Soviet leadership will not forget being forced to retreat. it might compel Khrushchev to take a more unyielding position on other issues just when we expect him to capitulate once again. JONATHAN HARRIS              

Associate in Government, Columbia College. New York, Oct. 22 1962.