In a speech delivered to the British Parliament in 1982, President Reagan called for a '"Campaign for Democracy" to "fashion the infrastructure of democracy" and assist "democratic development" throughout the world.' This speech was the inspiration for propaganda and ideological indoctrination that was to follow, especially with America's stance on events in Central America.

Theodore Draper A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair p51

In 1983 the United States was public in its support of the Nicaraguan Contra Guerillas. President Reagan publicly declared on May 4 1983 that he willingly accepted 'the idea of overt aid to the anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua.' As support continued, American opinion polls indicated that the public was not supportive of this action. Opponents believed that continued support would entangle the US in another Vietnam, while supporters believed that without support the Soviet Union would have the opportunity to develop influence and control in Central America. In the fiscal year of 1983, Congress passed an amendment that limited the purposes and amount of aid that the Government could administer to the Contras. Following the uncovering/discovery of the CIA's involvement in placing landmines in Nicaraguan harbours without Congress' knowledge or approval, public disapproval rose and congress support for the Administrations' policy dropped. Representative Edward P Boland was not alone in his outrage and led Congress to cut off all funds paid to the Contras forces with the intent of overthrowing the Sandinista Nicaraguan Government. This amendment is known as the Boland Amendment. However there was a loophole: the CIA and other agencies could be involved in Nicaragua if they could claim that the purpose for their involvement was something other than the overthrow of the Sandinista government. In the next fiscal year the Boland Amendment was revised and prohibited any funds for military or paramilitary operations. The first amendment had been relatively easy to get around, as non-profit organisations could be established, with indirect links to the administration, which could channel funds to the appropriate sources and continue in much the same manner as before. However, when Boland II was passed, the Administration was faced with a serious challenge: how to keep the Contras together "body and soul," as Reagan described it, with the clear stipulation from Congress that there was to be no funds or CIA involvement, overtly or covertly. Hence, the engagement of National Security Council staffs whose intended purpose was to operate within a domestic area of government: the NSC staff had never been, nor intended to be, used in an International covert function. Thus the Boland Amendments did not specifically stipulate that they were prohibited to act in this manner. This fine line of ambiguity was seized upon by North and his associates and they took over functions that the CIA could no longer manage in Nicaragua.

References
Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affair Hill and Wang, New York pp17-27,51
Lee Hamilton & Daniel Inouye Report of the Congressional Committees investigating the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR Washington 1987 p1