The Report of the Congressional Committees Invesitgating the IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR

Part 1- Executive Summary

The full story of the Iran-Contra affair is complicated, and, for this Nation, profoundly sad. In the narrative portion of this Report, the Committees present a comprehensive account of the facts, based op 10 months of investigation, including 11 weeks of hearings.
But the facts alone do not explain how this or why the events occurred. In this Executive Summary, the Committees focus on the key issues and offer their conclusions. Minority, supplemental, and additional views are printed in Section II and Section III.

Summary of the facts
The Iran-Contra Affair has its origin in two unrelated revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua. In Nicaragua, the long-time President, General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by a government controlled by Sandinista leftists. In Iran, the pro-Western Government of the Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi was overthrown in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The Khomeini Government, stridently anti-American, became a supporter of terrorism against American citizens.

Nicaragua
United States policy following the revolution in Nicaragua was to encourage the Sandinista Government to keep its pledges of pluralism and democracy. However, the Sandinista regime became increasingly anti-American and autocratic; began to aid leftist insurgency in El Salvador; and turned toward Cuba and the Soviet Union for political, military, and economic assistance. By December 1981, the United States had begun supporting the Nicaraguan Contras, armed opponents of the Sandinista regime.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the US Government agency that assisted the Contras. In accordance with the Presidential decisions, known as Findings, and with funds appropriated by Congress, the CIA armed, clothed, fed and supervised the Contras. Despite this assistance, the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua.
Although the President continued to favour support of the Contras, opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive. Opponents of the Administration's policy feared that US involvement with the Contras would embroil the United States in another Vietnam. Supporters of the policy feared that, without U. S support for the Contras, the Soviets would gain a dangerous toehold in Central America.
Congress prohibited Contra aid for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista Government in fiscal year 1983, and limited all aid to the Contras in fiscal year 1984 to $24 million. Following disclosure in March and April 1984 that the CIA had role in the Connections with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbours without adequate notification to Congress, public criticism mounted and the Administration's Contra policy lost much of it's support within Congress. After further vigorous debate, Congress exercised its Constitutional power over appropriations and cut off all funds to the Contras' military and paramilitary operations. The statutory provision cutting off funds, known as the Boland Amendment, was part of a fiscal year 1985 omnibus appropriations bills, and was signed into law by the President on October 12 1984.
Still, the President felt strongly about the Contras, and he ordered his staff, in the words of his National Security Adviser, to find a way to keep the Contras "body and soul together." Thus began the story of how the staff of a White House advisory body, the NSC staff, became an operational entity that secretly ran the Contra assistance effort, and later the Iran initiative. The action officer placed in charge of both operations was Lt.Col. Oliver L North.
Denied funding by Congress, the President turned to third countries and private sources. Between June 1984 and the beginning of 1986, the President, his National Security Adviser, and the NSC staff secretly raised $34 million for the Contras from other countries. An additional $2.7 million was provided for the Contras during 1985 and 1986 from private contributors, who were addressed by North and occasionally granted photo opportunities with the President. In the middle of this period, Assistant Secretary of State A. Langhorne Motley- from whom these contributions were concealed- gave his assurance to Congress that the Administration was not "soliciting and/or encouraging third countries" to give funds to the Contras because, as he conceded, the Boland Amendment prohibited such solicitation.
The first contributions were sent by the donors to bank accounts controlled and used by the Contras. However, in July 1985, North took control of the funds and -with the support of two National Security Advisers (Robert McFarlane and John Pointdexter) and, according to North, Director Casey- used those funds to run the covert operation to support the Contras.
At the suggestion of Director Casey, North recruited Richard V. Secord, a retired Air Force Major General with experience in special operations. Secord set up Swiss bank accounts, and North steered future donations into these accounts. Using these funds, and funds later generated by the Iran arms sales, Secord and his associate, Albert Hakim, created what they called "the Enterprise," a private organisation designed to engage in covert activities on behalf of the United States.
The Enterprise, functioning largely at North's direction, had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, operatives, ship, secure communications devices, and secret Swiss bank accounts. For 16 months, it served as the secret arm of the NSC staff, carrying out with private and non-appropriated money and without the accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA, a covert Contra aid program that Congress thought it had prohibited.
Although the CIA and other agencies involved in intelligence activities knew that the Boland Amendment barred their involvement in covert support for the Contras, North's Contra support operation received logistical and tactical support from various personnel in the CIA and other agencies. Certain CIA personnel in Central America gave their assistance. The U.S. Ambassador in Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs, provided his active assistance. North also enlisted the aid of Defense Department personnel in Central America, and obtained secure communications equipment from the National Security Agency. The Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for the region of this support, Elliott Abrams, professed ignorance of this support. He later stated that he had been "careful not to ask North lots of questions."
By Executive Order and National Security Decision Directive issued by President Reagan, all covert operations must be approved by the President personally and in writing. By statue, Congress must be notified about each covert action. The funds used for such actions, like all government funds, must be strictly accounted for.
The covert action directed by North however, was not approved by the President in writing. Congress was not notified about it. And the funds to support it were never accounted for. In short, the operation functioned without any accountability required of Government activities. It was an evasion of the Constitution's most basic check on Executive action- the power of Congress to grant or deny funding for Government programs.
Moreover, the overt action to support the Contra was concealed from Congress and the public. When the press reported in the summer of 1985 that the NSC staff was engaged in raising money and furnishing military support to the Contras, the President assured the public that the law was being followed. His National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, assured Committees of Congress, both in person and in writing, that the NSC staff was obeying both the spirit and letter of the law, and was neither soliciting money nor coordinating military support for the Contras.
A year later, McFarlane's successor, Vice Admiral John M. Pointdexter, repeated these assurances to Congressional Committees. Then, with Pointdexter's blessing, North told the House Intelligence Committee he was involved neither in fundraising for, nor in providing military advice to, the Contras.
When one of Secord's planes was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986, the President and several administration spokesmen assured the public that the U.S. Government had no connection with the flight or the captured American crew member, Eugene Hasenfus. Several senior Government officials, including Elliott Abrams, gave similar assurances to Congress.
Two moths later, McFarlane told Congressional Committees that he had no knowledge of contributions made by a foreign country, Country 2, to the Contras, when in fact McFarlane and the President had discussed and welcomed $32 million in contributions from that country. In addition, Abrams initially concealed from Congress- in testimony given to several Committees- that he had successfully solicited a contribution of $10 million from Brunei.
North conceded at the Committees' public hearings that he had participated in making statements to Congress that were "false", "misleading", "evasive and wrong."
During the period when the Administration was denying to Congress that it was involved in supporting the Contras' war effort, it was engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion and change the vote in Congress on Contra aid. Public funds were used to conduct public relations activities; and certain NSC staff members, using the prestige of the White House and the promise of meetings with the President, helped raise private donations for media campaigns and for weapons to be used by the Contras.
Pursuant to a Presidential directive in 1983 the Administration adopted a 'public diplomacy' program to promote the President's Central American policy. The program was conducted by an office in the State Department known as the Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, (S/LPD). S/LPD's activities were coordinated not within State Department, but an interagency working group established by the NSC. The principle NSC staff for a year with Casey's approval, and who upon retirement from the CIA became a Special Assistant to the President with responsibility for public diplomacy matters.
S/LPD produced and widely disseminated a variety of pro-Contra publications and arranged speeches and press conferences. It also disseminated what one official termed '"white propaganda": pro-Contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Administration. Moreover, under a series of sole source contracts in 1985 and 1986, S/LPD paid more that $400,000 for pro Contra public relations work to International Business Communications (IBS), a company owned by Richard Miller, whose organization was described by one White House representative as a "White House outside the White House."
The Administration, like Members of Congress, may appeal directly to the people for support of its positions; and government agencies may legitimately disseminate information and educational materials to the public. However, by law appropriated funds may not be used to generate propaganda "designed to influence a Member of Congress;" and by law, as interpreted by the Office of the Comptroller General, appropriated funds may not be used by the State Department for ''covert" propaganda activities. A GAO report concluded that S/LPD's white propaganda activities violated the ban of arranging "covert propaganda."
Private funds were also used. North and Miller helped Carl R. "Spitz" Channell raise $10 million, most of which went to Channell's tax-exempt organization, the National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty (NEPL). They arranged numerous "briefings" at the White House complex on Central America by Administration officials for groups of potential contributors. Following these briefings, Channell reconvened the groups at the Hay-Adams Hotel, and made a pitch for tax-deductible contributions to NEPL's Central America "public education" program or, in some individual cases, for weapons. Channell's major contributors were given in private briefings by North, and were afforded Private visits and photo sessions with the President. On one occasion, President Reagan participated in a briefing.
Using the donated money, Channell ran a series of television advertisements in 1985 and 1986, some of which were directed at television markets covering the home districts of Congressmen considered to be 'swing' votes on Contra aid. One series of advertisements was used to attack Congressman Mike Barnes, a principle opponent to Contra aid, and one of the Congressmen to whom Administration officials had denied violating the Boland Amendment in September of 1985. Channell later boasted that he "had participated in a campaign to ensure Congressman Barnes' defeat."
Of the $10 million raised by North, Channell and Miller, more than $1 million was used for pro-Contra publicity. Approximately $2.7 million was sent through IBC and off-shore accounts of another Miller-controlled company to Secord's Swiss accounts, or to Calero's account in Miami. Most of the remainder was spent on salaries and expenses for Channell, Miller and their business associates.
NEPL's charter did not contemplate raising funds for a covert war in Nicaragua, and the Internal Revenue Service never approved such activity when the NEPL was granted exempt status. As a consequence, Channell and Miller have each pleaded guilty to the crime of conspiring to defraud the United States Treasury of revenues "by subverting and corrupting the lawful purposes of NEPL." Channell named North as a conspirator.
In private fundraising, as in the "white propaganda" campaign, the goal of supporting the Contras was allowed to override sensitivity to law and to accepted norms of behaviour.
Iran
The NSC staff was already engaged in covert operations through Secord when, in the summer of 1985, the Government of Israel proposed that missiles be sold to Iran in return for the release of seven American hostages held in Lebanon and the prospects of improved relations with Iran. The Secretaries of State and Defense repeatedly opposed such sales to a government designated by the United States as a supporter of international terrorism. They called it a straight arms-for-hostages deal that was contrary to U.S. public policy. They also argued that these sales would violate the Arms Export Control Act, as well as the U.S. arms embargo against Iran. The embargo had been imposed after the taking of hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4 1979, and was continued because of the Iran-Iraq war.
Nevertheless, in the summer on 1985, the President authorized Israel to proceed with the sales. The NSC staff conducting the Contra covert action also took operational control of implementing the President's decisions on arms sales to Iran. The President did not sign a finding for this covert operation, nor did he notify the Congress.
Israel shipped 504 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran in August and September 1985. Although the Iranians had promised to release most of the American hostages in return, only one, Reverend Benjamin Weir, was freed. The President persisted. In November he authorized Israel to ship 80 HAWK anti-aircraft missiles in return for all the hostages, with a promise of prompt replenishment by the United States, and 40 more HAWKS to be sent directly by the United States to Iran. Eighteen HAWK missiles were actually shipped from Israel in November 1985, but no hostages were released.
In early December 1985, the President signed a retroactive Finding purporting to authorize the November HAWK transaction. That Finding contained no reference to improved relations with Iran. It was a straight arms-for-hostages Finding. National Security Adviser Pointdexter destroyed this Finding a year later because, he testified, its disclosure would have been politically embarrassing to the President.
The November HAWK transaction had additional significance. The Enterprise received a $1 million advance from the Israelis. North and Secord testified this was for transportation expenses in connection with the 120 HAWK missiles. Since only 18 missiles were shipped, the Enterprise was left with more than $800,000 in spare cash. North directed the Enterprise to retain the and spend it for the Contras. The "diversion" had begun.
North realized that the sale of missiles to Iran could be used to support the Contras. He told Israeli Defense Ministry officials on December 6 1985, one day after the President signed the Finding, that he planned to generate profits on future arms sales for activities in Nicaragua.
On December 7, 1985, the President and his top advisers met again to discuss the arms sales. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger objected more vigorously once more, and Weinberger argued that the sales would be illegal. After a meeting in London with an Iranian interlocutor and the Israelis, McFarlane recommended that the sales be halted. Admiral John Pointdexter (the new National Security Adviser), and Director Casey were aware of the opposite opinion.
The President decided to go forward with the arms sales to get the hostage back. He signed a Finding on January 6 1986, authorizing more shipments of missiles for the hostages. When the CIA's General Counsel pointed out that authorizing Israel to sell its U.S.-manufactured weapons to
Iran might violate the Arms Export Control Act, the President, on the legal advice of the Attorney General, decided to authorize direct shipments of the missiles to Iran by the United States and signed a new Finding on January 17 9168. To carry out the sales, the NSC staff turned once again to the Enterprise.
Although North had become sceptical that the sales would lead to the release of the hostages or a new relationship with Iran, he believed that the prospect of generating funds for the Contras was "an attractive incentive" for continuing the arms sales. No matter how many promises the Iranians failed to keep throughout this secret initiative, the arms sales continued to generate funds for the Enterprise, and North and his superior, Pointdexter, were consistent advocates for their continuation. What North and Pointdexter asserted in their testimony that they did not know, however, was that most of these arms sales profits would remain with the Enterprise and never reach the Contras.
In February 1986, the United States, acting through the Enterprise, sold 1,000 TOWs to the Iranians. The U.S. also provided the Iranians with the military intelligence about Iraq. All of the remaining American hostages were supposed to be released upon Iran's receipt of the first 500 TOWs. None was. But the transaction was productive in one respect. The difference between what the Enterprise paid the United States for the missiles and what it received from Iran was more than $6 million. North directed part of this profit for the Contras and for other covert operations. Pointdexter testified that he authorized this "diversion."
The diversion, for the Contras and other covert activities, was not an isolated act by the NSC staff. Pointdexter saw it as "implementing" the President's secret policy that had been in effect since 1984 of using Non-appropriated funds following the passage of the Boland Amendment.
According to North, CIA Director Casey saw the "diversion" as part of a more grandiose plan to use the Enterprise as a "stand alone", "off-the-shelf", covert capacity that would act throughout the world while evading Congressional Review. To Casey, Pointdexter, and North, the diversion was an integral part of selling arms to Iran and just one of the intended uses of the proceeds.
In May 1986, the President again tried to sell weapons to get the hostages back. This time, the President agreed to ship parts for the HAWK missiles but only on the condition that all American hostages in Lebanon be releases first. A mission headed by Robert McFarlane, the former National Security Adviser, travelled to Tehran with the first instalment of the HAWK parts. When the mission arrived, McFarlane learned that the Iranians claimed they had never promised to do anything more than try to obtain the hostages' release. The trip ended amid misunderstanding and failure, although the first instalment of HAWK parts were delivered.
The Enterprise was paid, however, for all of the HAWK parts, and realized more than an $8 million profit, part of which was applied, at North's direction, to the Contras. Another portion of the profit was used by North for other covert operations, including the operation of a ship for a secret mission. The idea of an off-the-shelf, stand-alone covert capacity had become operational.
On July 26, 1986, another American hostage, Father Lawrence Jenco, was released. Despite all the arms sales, he was only the second hostage freed, and the first since September 1985. Even though McFarlane had vowed at the Tehran meeting nor to deliver the remainder of the HAWK parts until all the hostages were released, the Administration capitulated again. The balance of the HAWK parts was shipped when Father Jenco was released.
In September and October 1986, the NSC staff began negotiating with a new group of Iranians, the "Second Channel", that Albert Hakim had opened, in part through promise of bribes. Although these Iranians allegedly had better contacts with Iranian officials, they in fact, represented the same principals as did the First Channel and had the same arrangement in mind, the Administration insisted on release of all the hostages but settled for less.
In October, after a meeting in London, North left Hakim to negotiate with the Iranians. Hakim made no secret of his desire to make large profits for himself and general Secord in the $15 billion-a-year Iranian market if relations with the Untied States could be restored. Thus, he had every incentive to make an agreement, whatever concessions might be required.
As an unofficial "ambassador" selected by North and Secord, Hakim produced a remarkable nine-point plan, subsequently approved by North and Pointdexter, under which the United States would receive "one and a half" hostages (later reduced to one). Under the plan, the United States agreed not only to sell the Iranians 500 more TOWs, but Secord and Hakim promised to develop a plan to induce the Kuwaiti Government to release the Da'wa prisoners (Seventeen Kuwaiti prisoners, connected to "al-Dawa", and Iranian revolutionary group, had been convicted and imprisoned for their parts in the December 12, 1983, attacks in Kuwait on the U.S. Embassy, a U.S. civilian compound, the French Embassy, and several Kuwait I Government facilities. The plan to obtain the release of the Da'wa prisoners did not succeed, but the TOW missiles for sold for use by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Following the transfer of these TOWs, a third hostage, David Jacobsen, was released on November 2 1986, and more profit was generated for the Enterprise.
Pointdexter testified that the President approved the nine-point. But other testimony raises questions about this assertion. Regardless of what Pointdexter may have told the President, Secretary Shultz that when he informed the President on December 14 1986, that the nine-point plan included a promise about the release of the Da'wa prisoners in Kuiwait, the President reacted with shock, "like he had kicked in the belly."
During the negotiations with the Second Channel, North and Secord told the Iranians that the President agreed with their positions that Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein, had to be removed and further agreed that the United States would defend Iran against Soviet aggression. They did not clear this with the President and their representations were flatly contrary to U.S. policy.
The decision to designate private parties- Secord and Hakim- to carry out the arms transactions had other ramifications. First, there was virtually no accounting for the profits from the arms deals. Even North claimed that he did not know how Secord and Hakim actually spent the money committed to their custody. The committees' investigation revealed that of the $16.1 million profit from the sales of arms to Iran only about $3.8 million went to support the Contras (the amount representing "the diversion"). All told, the Enterprise received nearly $48 million from the sale of arms to the Contras and Iran, and in contributions directed to it by North. A total of $16.5 million was used to support the Contras or to purchase the arms sold to (and paid for by) the Contras; $15.2 million was spent on Iran; Hakim, Secord, and their associate, Thomas Clines, took $6.6 million in commissions and other profit distributions; almost $1 million went for Other covert operations sponsored by North; $4.2 million was held in "reserves" for use in future operations; $1.2 million remained in Swiss bank accounts for the Enterprise; and several thousand dollars were used to pay for a security system at North's residence.
Second, by permitting private parties to conduct arms sales, the Administration risked losing control of an important foreign policy initiative. Private citizens- whose motivations of personal gain could conflict with the interests of this country- handled sensitive diplomatic negotiations, and purported to commit the United States to positions that were anathema to the President's public policy and wholly unknown to the Secretary of State.

The cover up
The sale of arms to Iran was a "significant anticipated intelligence activity." By law, such an activity ,must be reported to Congress "in a timely fashion" pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act. If the proposal to sell arms to Iran had been reported, the Senate and House Intelligence Committees would likely have joined Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger in objecting to this initiative. But Pointdexter recommended- and the President decided- not to report the Iran initiative to Congress.
Indeed, the Administration went to considerable lengths to avoid notifying Congress. The CIA General Counsel wrote on January 15 1986, the "key issue in this entire matter revolves around whether or not these will be reports made to Congress." Shortly thereafter, the transaction was restructured to avoid the pre-shipment reporting requirements of the Arms Export Control Act, and place it within the more limited reporting requirements of the National Security Act. But even these reporting requirements were ignored. The President failed to notify the group of eight (the leaders of each party in the House and Senate, and the Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of the Intelligence Committees) specified by laws for unusually sensitive operations.
After the disclosure of the Iran arms sales on November 3, 1986, the American public was still not told the facts. The President sought to avoid any comment on the ground that it might jeopardise the chance of securing the remaining hostages' release. But it was impossible to remain silent, and inaccurate statements followed.
In his first public statement on the subject on November 6, the President said that reports concerning the arms sales had "no foundation." A week later, on November 13, the President conceded that the United States had sold arms, but branded as "utterly false" the allegations that the sales were in return for the release of the hostages. The President also maintained that there had been no violations of federal law.
At his news conference on November 19, 1986, he denied that the United States was involved in the Israeli sales that occurred prior to the January, 17 1986 Finding. The President was asked:

Mr. President…are you telling us tonight that only shipments with which we were involved were the one or two that followed you January 17 Finding and that… there were no other shipments which the U.S. condoned?

The President replied:

That's right. I'm saying nothing, but the missiles we sold.

And on November 25, 1986, the Attorney General- with the President at his side- announced at a press conference that the President did not know of the Israeli Shipments until after they had occurred. He stated that the President learned of the November 1985 HAWK shipment in February 1986.
In fact, however, the Israeli sales, including the HAWK shipment, were implemented with the knowledge and approval of the President and his top advisers; and the President himself told Shultz on the day of his press conference that he had known of the November 1985 shipment when it occurred. McFarlane, Pointdexter, and North were intimately involved in the Israeli shipments; and the CIA had actually transported one delivery from Israel to Iran.
While the President was denying any illegality, his subordinates were engaging in a cover-up. Several of his advisers had expressed concern that the 1985 sales violated the Arms Export Control Act, and a "cover story" had been agreed on if these arms sales were ever exposed. After North had three conversations on November 18, 1986, about the legal problems with the Israeli shipments, he, Pointdexter, Casey and McFarlane all told conforming false stories about U.S. involvement in these shipments.
With McFarlane's help, North rewrote NSC staff chronologies on November 19 and 20, 1986, in such a way that they denied contemporaneous knowledge by Administration of Israel's shipments to Iran in 1985. They asserted at one point that the U.S. Government believed the November 1985 shipment consisted of 'oil-drilling equipment,' not arms.
Pointdexter told Congressional Committees on November 21, 1986, that the United States had disapproved of the Israeli Shipments and that, until the day before his briefing, he believed that the Administration officials did not know about any of them until after they had occurred. He then destroyed the only Finding signed by the President that showed the opposite.
Casey told Congressional Committees on November 21, 1986, that although a CIA proprietary airline had actually carried missiles to Iran from Israel in 1985, the proprietary had been told the cargo was "oil-drilling equipment."
McFarlane told the Attorney General on November 21, 1986, that the Israelis said they were shipping oil-drilling equipment in November 1985 and that McFarlane did not learn otherwise until May 1986.
On learning that the President had authorized the Attorney General to gather relevant facts, North and Pointdexter shredded and altered official documents on November 21, 1986, and later that weekend. On November 25, 1986, North's secretary concealed classified documents in her clothing and, with North's knowledge, removed them from the White House.
According to North, a "fall guy" plan was proposed by Casey in which North and, if necessary, Pointdexter, would take the responsibility for the covert Contra support operation and the diversion. On Saturday November 22, 1986, in the midst of the efforts to conceal what had happened, Pointdexter had a two and one half hour lunch with Casey. Yet Pointdexter could not recall anything that was discussed.
North testified that he assured Pointdexter that he had destroyed all documents relating to the diversion. The diversion nevertheless was discovered on November 22, 1986, when a Justice Department official, assisting the Attorney General's fact-finding inquiry, found a "diversion memorandum" that had escaped the shredder.
Prior to the discovery of the memorandum, each interview by the Attorney General's fact finding team had been conducted in the presence of two witnesses, and careful noted were taken in accordance with standard professional practices. After the discovery of the diversion memorandum-which itself gave rise to an inference of serious wrongdoing- the Attorney General departed from these standard practices. A series of important interviews- Pointdexter, McFarlane, Casey, Regan, and Bush- was conducted by the Attorney General alone and no notes were made.
The Attorney General then announced at his November 25 press conference that the diversion had occurred and that the President did not know of it. But he made several incorrect statements about his own investigations. He stated that the President had not known of the Israeli pre-Finding shipments, and he stated that the proceeds of the arms sales had been sent directly from the Israelis to the Contras. The statements were both mistaken and inconsistent with information that had been received during the Attorney General's fact-finding inquiry.
Pointdexter testified to these Committees that the President did not know of the diversion. North testified that while he assumed the President had authorized each diversion, Pointdexter told him on November 21, 1986, that the President had never been told of the diversion.
In light of the destruction of material evidence by Poindexter and North and of the death of Casey, all of the facts may never be known. The committees cannot even be sure wether they heard the whole truth or whether Casey's "fall guy" plan was carried out at the hearings. But enough is clear to demonstrate beyond doubt that fundamental processed were disregarded and the rule of law subverted.

Findings and Conclusions
The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception and distain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. They told neither the Secretary of State, the Congress nor the American people of their actions. When disclosure was threatened, they destroyed official documents and lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in Congress. They testified that they even withheld key facts from the President.
The United States Constitution specifies the process by which laws and policy are to be made and executed. Constitutional process is the essence of our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our strength. Time and time again we have learned that a flawed process leads to bad results, and that a lawless process leads to worse.

Policy Contradictions and Failures
The Administration's departure from democratic processes created the conditions for policy failure, and led to contradictions which undermines the credibility of the United States.
The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign policies- a public one and a secret one:
- The public policy was not to make any concessions for the release of hostages lest such concessions encourage more hostage-taking. At the same time, the United States was secretly trading weapons to get the hostages back.
- The public policy was to ban arms shipments to Iran and to exhort other Governments to observe this embargo. At the same time, the United States was secretly selling sophisticated missiles to Iran and promising more.
The public policy was to improve relations with Iraq. At the same time, the United States secretly shared military intelligence on Iraq with Iran and North told the Iranians in contradiction to United States policy that the United States would help promote the overthrow of the Iraqi government.
- The public policy was to urge all Governments to punish terrorism and to support, indeed encourage, the refusal of Kuwait to free the Da'wa prisoners who were convicted of terrorist acts. At the same time, senior officials secretly endorsed a Secord-Hakim plan to permit Iran to obtain the release of the Da'wa prisoners.
- The public policy was to observe the 'letter and spirit' of the Boland Amendment's prescriptions against military or paramilitary assistance to the Contras. At the same time, the NSC staff was secretly assuming direction and funding of the Contras' military effort.
- The public policy, embodied in agreements signed by Director Casey, was for the Administration to consult with the Congressional oversight committees about covert activities in a 'new spirit of frankness and cooperation.' At the same time, the CIA and the White House were secretly withholding from those Committees all information concerning the Iran initiative and the Contra support network.
- The public policy, embodied in Executive Order 12333, was to conduct covert operations soley through the CIA or other organs of the intelligence community specifically authorized by the President. At the same time, although the NSC was not authorized, the NSC staff secretly became operational and used private, non-accountable agents to engage in covert activities.

These contradictions in policy inevitably resulted in policy failure:
- The United States armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but attained neither a new relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction in the number of American hostages.
- The arms sales did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies. Moderates did not come forward, and Iran to this day sponsors actions directed against the United States in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.
- The United States opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might reveal the secret arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill the hostages if the sales stopped.
- The United States undermined its credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to Iran while undertaking such arms sales in secret.
- The Untied States lost a $10 million contribution to the Contras from the Sultan of Brunei by directing it to the wrong bank account- the result of an improper effort to channel that humanitarian aid contribution into an account used for lethal assistance.
- The United States sought to illicit funding for the Contras through profits form the secret arms sales, but a substantial portion of those profits ended up in the personal bank accounts of the private individuals executing the sales- while the exorbitant amounts charged for the weapons inflamed the Iranians with whom the United States was seeking a new relationship.

Flawed Policy Process
The record of the Iran-Contra Affair also shows a seriously flawed policymaking process.

Conclusion
There was confusion and disarray at the highest levels of Government.
- McFarlane embarked on a dangerous trip to Tehran under a complete misapprehension. He thought the Iranians had promised to secure the release of all hostages before he delivered arms, when in fact they had promised only to seek the hostages' release, and then only after one planeload of arms had arrived.
- The President first told the Tower Board that he had approved the initial Israeli shipments. Then, he told the Tower Board that he had not. Finally, he told the Tower Board that he does not know whether he approved the initial Israeli shipments, and his top advisers disagree on the question.
- The President claims he does not recall signing a Finding approving the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran. But Pointdexter testified that the President did sign a Finding on December 5, 1985, approving the shipment retroactively. Pointdexter later destroyed the Finding to save the President from embarrassment.
- That Finding was prepared with adequate discussion and stuck in Pointdexter's safe for a year; Pointdexter claimed he forgot about it; the White House asserts the President never signed it; and when events began to unravel, Pointdexter ripped it up.
- The President and the Attorney General told the public that the President did not know about the November 1985 Israeli HAWK shipment until February 1986- an error the White House Chief of Staff explained by saying that the preparation for the conference 'sort of confused the Presidential mind.'
- Pointdexter says the President would have approved the diversion, if he had been asked; and the President says he would not have.
- One National Security Adviser understood that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC; another thought that it did not. Neither sought a legal opinion on the question.
- The President incorrectly assured the American people that the NSC staff was adhering to the law and that the Government was not connected to the Hasenfus airplane. His staff was in fact conducting a 'full service' covert operation to support the Contras which they believed he had authorized.
- North says he sent five or six completed memorandums to Pointdexter seeking the President's approval for the diversion. Pointdexter does not remember receiving any. Only one has been found.

Dishonesty and Secrecy
The Iran-Contra Affair was characterised by pervasive dishonesty and inordinate secrecy.
North admitted that he and other officials lied repeatedly to Congress and the American people about the Contra covert action and Iran arms sales, and that he altered and destroyed official documents. North's testimony demonstrates that he also lied to members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney General, and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC.
Secrecy became an obsession. Congress was never informed of the Iran or Contra covert actions, not withstanding the requirement in the law that Congress be notified of all covert actions in a "timely fashion."
Pointdexter said that Donald Regan, the President's Chief of Staff, was not told because he might reveal it to the press. Secretary Shultz objected to third-country solicitation in 1984 shortly before the Boland Amendment was adopted; accordingly, he was not told that, in the same time period, the National Security Adviser accepted an $8 million contribution from Country 2 even though the State Department had prime responsibility for dealings with that country. Nor was the Secretary of State told by the President in February 1985 that the same country had pledged another $24 million- even though the President briefed the Secretary of State in his meeting with the head of state at which the pledge was made. Pointdexter asked North to keep secrets from Casey; Casey, North, and Pointdexter agreed to keep secrets from Shultz.
Pointdexter and North cited fear of leaks as a justification for these practices. But the need to prevent public disclosure cannot justify the deception practices upon Members of Congress and Executive branch officials by those who knew of the arms sales to Iran and the Contra support network. The State and Defence Departments deal with the most sensitive matters affecting millions of lives here and abroad. The Congressional Intelligence Committees receive the most highly classified information, including information on covert activities. Yet, according to North and Pointdexter, even the senior officials of these bodies could not be entrusted with the NSC's staff secrets because they might leak.
While Congress's record in maintaining the confidentiality of classified information is not unblemished, it is not nearly as poor or perforated as some members of the NSC staff maintained. If the Executive branch has any basis to suspect that any member of the Intelligence Committees breached security, it has the obligation to bring that breach to the attention of the House and Senate Leaders- not make blanket accusations. Congress has the capability and responsibility of protecting secrets entrusted to it. Congress cannot fulfil its legislative responsibilities if it is denied information because members of the Executive branch, who place their faith in a band of international arms merchants and financiers, unilaterally declare Congress unworthy of trust.
In the case of the 'secret' Iran arms-for-hostages deal, although the NSC staff did not inform the Secretary of State, or the leadership of Congress, it was content to let the following persons know:
-Manucher Ghorbanifar, who flunked every polygraph test administrated by the U.S. government;
-Iranian officials, who daily denounced the United States but received an inscribed
Bible from the President;
-Officials of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, who received the U.S. weapons;
-Secord and Hakim, whose personal interests could conflict with the interests of the United States;
-Israeli officials, international arms merchants, pilots and air crews, whose interests did not always coincide with ours, and
-An unknown number of shadowy intermediaries and financiers who assisted with both the First and Second Iranian Channels.
While sharing intelligence with this disparate group, North ordered the intelligence agencies not to disseminate intelligence on the Iran initiative to the Secretaries of State and Defense. Pointdexter told the Secretary of State in May 1986 that the Iran initiative was over, at the time the mission to Tehran was being launched. Pointdexter also concealed from Cabinet officials the remarkable nine-point agreement negotiated by Hakim with the Second Channel. North assured the FBI liaison to the NSC as late as November 1986 that the United States was not bargaining for the release of hostages but seizing terrorists to exchange for hostages- a complete fabrication. The lies, omissions, shredding, attempts to rewrite history- all continued, even after the President authorized the Attorney General to find out all the facts.
It was not operational security that motivated such conduct- not when our own Government was the victim. Rather, the NSC staff feared, correctly, that any disclosure to Congress or the Cabinet of the arms-for-hostages and arms-for-profit activities would produce a storm of outrage.
As with Iran, Congress was misled about the NSC staff's support for the Contras during the period of the Boland Amendment, although the role of the NSC staff was no secret to others. North testified tat his operation was well-known to the press in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. It was not a secret from Nicaragua's neighbours, with whom the NSC staff communicated throughout the period. It was not a secret from the third countries- including a totalitarian state-from whom the NSC staff sough arms of funds. It was not a secret from the private resupply network which North recruited and supervised. According to North, even Ghorbanifar knew.
The Administration never sought to hide its desire to assist the Contras so long as aid was authorized by statute. On the contrary, it wanted the Sandinistas to know that the United States supported the Contras. After enactment of the Boland Amendment, the Administration repeatedly and publicly called upon Congress to resume U.S. assistance. Only the NSC staff's Contra support activities were kept under wraps. The Committees believe these actions were concealed in order to prevent Congress from learning that the Boland Amendment was being circumvented.
It was stated on several occasions that the confusion, secrecy and deception surrounding the aid program for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters was produced in part by Congress' shifting positions on Contra aid.
But Congress' inconsistency mirrored the chameleon-like nature of the rationale offered for granting assistance in the first instance. Initially, Congress was told that our purpose was simply to interdict the flow of weapons from Nicaragua into El Salvador. Then Congress was told that our purpose was to harass the Sandinistas to prevent them from consolidating their power and exporting their revolution. Eventually, Congress was told that our purpose was to eliminate all foreign forces from Nicaragua, to reduce the size of the Sandinista armed forces, and to restore the democratic reforms pledged by the Sandinistas during the overthrow of the Samoza regime.
Congress had cast a sceptical eye upon each rationale proffered by the Administration. It suspected that the Administration's true purpose was identical to that of the Contras- the overthrow of the Sandinista regime itself. Ultimately Congress yielded to domestic political pressure to discontinue assistance to the Contras, but Congress was unwilling to bear responsibility for the loss of Central America to communist military and political forces. So Congress compromised, providing in 1985 humanitarian aid to the Contras; and the NSC provided what Congress prohibited: lethal support for the Contras.
Compromise is no excuse for violation of the law and deceiving Congress. A law is no less a law because it is passed by a slender majority, or because Congress is open-minded about its reconsideration in the future.
Privatization
The NSC staff turned to private parties and third countries to do the Government's business. Funds denied by Congress were obtained by the Administration from third countries and private citizens. Activities normally conducted by the professional intelligence services- which are accountable to Congress- were turned over to Secord and Hakim.
The solicitation of foreign funds by an Administration to pursue foreign policy goals rejected by Congress is dangerous and improper. Such solicitations, when done secretly and without Congressional authorization, create a risk that the foreign country will expect and demand something in return. McFarlane testified that 'any responsible official has an obligation to acknowledge that every country in the world will see benefit to itself by ingratiating itself with the United States.' North, in fact, proposed rewarding a Central American country with foreign assistance funds for facilitating shipments to the Contras. And Secord, who had once been in charge of the U.S. Air Force's foreign military sales said, 'where there is quid, there is a quo.'
Moreover, under the Constitution only Congress can provide funds for the Executive branch. The Framers intended Congress's 'power of the purse' to be one with the principal checks on Executive action. It was designed, among other things, to prevent the Executive from involving this country unilaterally in a foreign conflict. The Constitutional plan does not prohibit a President from asking a foreign state, or anyone else, to contribute funds to a third party. But it does prohibit such solicitation where the United States exercises control over their receipt and expenditure. By circumventing Congress' power of the purse through third country and private contributions to the Contras, the Administration undermined a cardinal principle of the Constitution.
Further, by turning to private citizens, the NSC staff jeopardized its own objectives. Sensitive negotiations were conducted by parties with little experience in diplomacy and financial interests of their own. The diplomatic aspect of the mission failed- the United States today has no long-term relationship with Iran and no fewer hostages in captivity. But the private financial aspect succeeded- Secord and Hakim took $2.2 million more for their personal benefit; in addition, they set aside reserves of over $4 million in Swiss bank accounts of the Enterprise.
Covert operations of this Government should only be directed and conducted by the trained professional services that are accountable to the President and Congress. Such operations should never be delegates, as they were here, to private citizens in order to evade Governmental restrictions.
Lack of Accountability
The confusion, deception, and privatization which marked the Iran-Contra Affair were the inevitable products of an attempt to avoid accountability. Congress, the Cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs were denied information and excluded from the decision-making process. Democratic procedures were disregarded.
Officials who make public policy must be accountable to the public. But the public cannot hold officials accountable for policies of which the public is unaware. Policies that are known can be subjected to the test of reason, and mistakes can be corrected after consultation with the Congress and deliberation within the Executive branch itself. Policies that are secret become the private preserve of the few, mistakes are inevitably perpetuated, and the public loses control over the Government. That is what happened in the Iran-Contra Affair:
-The President's NSC staff carried out a covert action in furtherance of his policy to sustain the Contras, but the President said he did not know about it.
- The President's NSC staff secretly diverted millions of dollars in profits from the Iran arms sales to the Contras, but the President said he did not know about it and Pointdexter claimed he did not tell him.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff was not informed of the Iran arms sales, nor was he ever consulted regarding the impact of such sales on the Iran-Iraq war or on U.S. military readiness.
- The Secretary of State was not informed of the millions of dollars in Contra contributions solicited by the NSC staff from foreign governments with which the State Departments deals each day.
- The Congress was told almost nothing- and what it was told was false.

Deniability replaced accountability. Thus, Pointdexter justified his decision not to inform the President of the diversion on the ground that he wanted to give the President 'deniability'. Pointdexter said he wanted to shield the President form political embarrassment if the diversion became public.
This kind of thinking is inconsistent with democratic governance. 'Plausible denial' an accepted concept in intelligence activities, means structuring an authorized covert operation so that, if discovered by the party against whom it is directed, United States involvement may be plausibly denied. That is a legitimate feature of authorized covert operations. In no circumstance, however, does 'plausible denial' mean structuring an operation so that it may be concealed from -or denied to- the highest elected officials of the United States Government itself.
The very premise of democracy is that 'we the people' are entitled to make our own choices on fundamental policies. But freedom of choice is illusory if policies are kept, not only from the public, but from its elected representatives.

Intelligence Abuses

Covert Operations
As former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane testified, 'it is clearly unwise to rely on covert action as the core of our policy.'' The Government cannot keep a policy secret and still secure the public support necessary to sustain it. Yet it was precisely because the public would not support the Contra policy, and was unlikely to favour arms deals with Iran, that the NSC staff went underground. This is was a perversion of the proper concept of covert operations:
- Covert operations should be conducted in accordance with strict rules of accountability and oversight. In the mid-1970s, in response to disclosures of abuses within the intelligence community, the Government enacted a series of safeguards. Each covert action was to be approved personally by the President, funded by Congressional appropriations, and Congress was to be informed.
In the Iran-Contra Affair, these rules were violated. The President, according to Pointdexter, was never informed of the diversion. The President says he knew nothing of the covert action to support the Contras, or the companies funded by non-appropriated monies set up by North to carry out that support. Congress was not notified of either the Iran or Contra operations.
- Covert actions should be consistent with publicly defined U.S. foreign policy goals. Because covert operations are secret by definition, they are of course not openly debated or publicly approved. So long as the policies which they further are known, and so long as they are conducted in accordance with law, covert operations are acceptable. Here, however, the Contra covert operation was carried out in violation of the country's public policy as expressed in the Boland Amendment; and the Iran covert operation was carried out in violation of the country's stated policy against selling arms to Iran or making concessions to terrorists. These were not covert actions, they were covert policies and are incompatible with democracy.
- Finally, covert operations are intended to be kept from foreign powers, not from the Congress and responsible Executive agencies within the United States Government itself. As Clair George, CIA Director of Operations, testified: 'to think that because we deal in lies, and overseas we may lie and we may do other things, that therefore that gives you some permission, some right or some particular reason to operate that way with your fellow employees, I would not only disagree with that I would say it would a destruction of s secret service in a democracy.' In the Iran-Contra Affair, secrecy was used to justify lies to Congress, as the Attorney General, other Cabinet officials, and the CIA. It was used not as a shield against out own adversaries, but as a weapon against our own democratic institutions.
The NSC Staff
The NSC staff was created to give the President policy advice on major national security and foreign policy issues. Here, however, it was used to gather intelligence and conduct covert operations. This departure from its proper functions contributed to policy failure.
During the Iran initiative, the NSC staff became the principal body for both gathering and coordinating intelligence on Iran and for recommending policy to the President. The staff relied on the Iranians who were interested only in buying arms, including Ghorbanifar, whom CIA officials regarded as a fabricator. Pointdexter, in recommending to the President the sale of weapons to Iran, gave as one of his reasons that Iraq was winning the Gulf War. That assessment was contrary to the views of intelligence professionals at the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA, who had concluded as early as 1983 that Iran was winning the war. Casey, who collaborated with North and Pointdexter on the Iran and Contra programs, also tailored intelligence reports to the positions he advocated. The record shows that the President believed and acted on these erroneous reports.
Secretary Shultz pointed out that the intelligence and policy functions do not mix, because 'it is too tempting to have your analysis on the selection of information that is presented favour the policy you are advocating.' The Committees agree on the need to separate the intelligence and policy functions. Otherwise, there is too great a risk that the interpretation of intelligence will be skewed to fit predetermined policy choices.
In the Iran-Contra Affair, the NSC staff not only combined intelligence and policy functions, but it became operational and conducted covert operations. As the CIA was subjected to greater Congressional scrutiny and regulation, a few Administration officials- including Director Casey- came to believe that the CIA could no longer be utilized for daring covert operations. So the NSC staff was enlisted to provide assistance in covert operations that the CIA could not or would not furnish.
This was a dangerous misuse of the NSC staff. When covert operations are conducted by those on whom the President relies to present policy options, there is no agency in government to objectively scrutinize, challenge and evaluate plans and activities. Checks and balances are lost. The high policy decisions confronting a President can rarely be resolved by the methods and techniques used by experts in the conduct of covert operations. Problems of public policy must be dealt with through consultation, not Pointdexter's 'compartmentation'; with honesty and confidentiality, not deceit.
The NSC was created to provide candid and comprehensive advice to the President. It is the judgement of these Committees that the NSC staff should never again engage in covert operations.

Distain for Law
In the Iran-Contra Affair, officials viewed the law not as setting boundaries for their actions, but raising impediments to their goals. When the goals and the law collided the law gave way:
-The covert program of support for the Contras evaded the Constitution's most significant check on Executive power: the President can spend funds on a program only if he can convince Congress to appropriate the money.
When Congress enacted the Boland Amendment, cutting off funds for the war in Nicaragua, Administration officials raised funds for the Contras from other sources- foreign Governments, the Iran arms sales, and private individuals; and the NSC staff controlled the expenditures of these funds through power over the Enterprise. Conducting the covert program in Nicaragua with funding from the sale of U.S. Government property and contributions raised by Government officials was a flagrant violations of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.
- In addition, the covert program of support for the Contras was an evasions of the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. The President made it clear that while he opposed restrictions on military or paramilitary assistance to the Contras, he recognized that compliance with the law was not optional. '(W)hat I might personally wish or what our Government might wish still would not justify us violating the law of the land,' he said in 1983.
A year later, members of the NSC staff were devising ways to continue support and direction of Contra activities during the period of the Boland Amendment. What was previously done by the CIA- and now prohibited by the Boland Amendment- would now be done instead by the NSC staff.
The President set the stage by welcoming a huge donation for the Contras from a foreign Government- a contribution clearly intended to keep the Contras in the field while U.S. aid was barred. The NSC staff thereafter solicited other foreign Governments, for military aid, facilitated the efforts of U.S. fundraisers to provide lethal assistance to the Contras, and ultimately developed and directed a private network that conducted, in North's words, a 'full service covert operation' in support of the
Contras.
This could not have been more contrary to the intent of the Boland legislation.
Numerous other laws were disregarded:
- North's full-service covert operation was a 'significant anticipated intelligence activity' required to be disclosed to the Intelligence Committees of Congress under Section 501 of the National Security Act. No such disclosure was made.
- By Executive order, a covert operation requires a persona; determination by the President before it can be conducted by an agency other than the CIA. It requires a written Finding before any agency can carry it out. In the case of North's full-service covert operations in support of the Contras, there was no such personal determination and no such Finding. In fact, the President disclaims any knowledge of this covert action.
- False statements to Congress are felonies if made with knowledge and intent. Several Administration officials gave statements denying NSC staff activities in support of the Contras which North later described in his testimony as 'false', and 'misleading, evasive, and wrong.'

- The application of proceeds from U.S. arms sales for the benefit of the Contra war effort violated the Boland Amendment's ban on U.S. military aid to the Contras, and constituted a misappropriation of Government funds derived from the transfer of U.S. property.
- The U.S. Government's approval of the pre-Finding 1985 sales by Israel of arms to the Government of Iran was inconsistent with the Government's obligations under the Arms Export Control Act.
- The testimony to Congress in November 1986 that the U.S. Government had no contemporaneous knowledge of the Israeli shipments, and the shredding of documents relating to the shipments while a Congressional inquiry into those shipments was pending, obstructed Congressional investigations.
- The Administration did not make, and clearly intended never to make, disclosure to the Intelligence Committees of the Finding- later destroyed- approving the November 1985 HAWK shipment, nor did it disclose the covert action to which the Finding related.
The Committees make no determination as to whether any particular individual involved in the Iran-Contra Affair acted with criminal intent or was guilty of any crime. That is a matter for the Independent Counsel and the Courts. But the Committees reject any notion that worthy ends justify violations of law by Government officials; and the Committees condemn without reservation the making of false statements to Congress and the withholding, shredding, and alteration of documents relevant to a pending inquiry.
Administration officials have, if anything, an even greater responsibility than private citizens to comply with the law. There is no place in Government for law breakers.

Congress and the President
The Constitution of the United States gives important powers to both the President and the Congress in the making of foreign policy. The President is the principal architect of foreign policy in consultation with the Congress. The policies of the United States cannot succeed unless the President and Congress work together.
Yet, in the Iran-Contra Affair, Administration officials holding no elected office repeatedly evidenced disrespect for Congress' efforts to perform its Constitutional oversight orle in foreign policy:
-Pointdexter testified, referring to his efforts to keep the covert action in support of the Contras from Congress: 'I simply did not want any outside interference.'
- North testified: 'I did not want to tell Congress anything' about this covert action.
- Abrams acknowledge in his testimony that, unless Members of Congressional Committees asked 'exactly the right question, using exactly the right words, they weren't going to get the right answers,' regarding solicitation of third-countries for Contra support.
- And numerous other officials made false statement to, and misled the Congress.
Several witnesses at the hearings stated or implied that foreign policy should be left solely to the President to do as he chooses, arguing that shared powers have no place in a dangerous world. But the theory of our Constitution is the opposite: policies formed through consultation and the democratic processed are better and wiser that those formed without it. Circumvention of Congress is self-defeating, for no foreign policy can succeed without the bipartisan support of Congress.

In a system of shared powers, decision- making requires mutual respect between the branches of government.
The Committees were reminded by Secretary Shultz during the hearings that 'trust is the coin of the realm.' Democratic government is not possible without trust between the branches of government and between the government and the people. Sometimes that trust is misplaced and the systems falters. But for officials to work outside the system because it does not produce the results they seek is a prescription for failure.