What was the role of the congressional report? There were two major reports on the Iran-Contra Affair, the Report of the Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra Affairand the Tower Commission Report. The former reported to Congress, the latter reported to the President's Special Review Board, both groups formed specifically for these investigations. Both reports concluded that essentially the Iran-Contra Affair was the result of bad people, rather than inadequate laws. Another other view is that in fact the laws were inadequate and the people involved were simultaneously misguided and unchecked in their interpretation and violation of those laws. Perhaps there ought to be a third option, that inadequate legislation allowed and enabled 'bad' people to behave in inappropriate ways.

The Tower report found that the Iran-Contra Affair was the result of both inept policy and poor implementation of it, laying the responsibility at the feet of the President, who should have developed better policies and had more control over his staff. The report also states that the implications of NSC staff, rather than the CIA, having operational control over the covert action in the Middle East were insufficiently considered. However, after examining the role and definitions of the NSC, the report concluded that the NSC is moulded by the personality and approach of the individual President. Thus there were no inherent flaws with the definitions of the NSC's role or legislation, rather the onus needed to be placed on the individuals involved and ultimately the President.

Both reports agreed that the key players in the Affair had violated and shown contempt of the law, however neither placed a great emphasis on the ineffective legislation that had allowed them to misinterpret and disregard its ruling. The definition of NSC's role had stated that it should play a supportive role in security affairs, rather than an active one, thus when the Boland Amendment was passed a technical loop-hole allowed the NSC to argue that it was not covered by this legislation. It was not covered because it had never been intended to be an active player in security operations, rather strictly an advisory body for the President. However the Tower report concluded that the 'solution does not lie in revamping the National Security Council System. The system is properly the President's creature. It must be left flexible to be molded by the President into the form most useful to him. Otherwise it will become… an obstacle to the President…'

The Congressional Report on the other hand stated that the Boland Amendment prohibited government support for the Contras, and describes how North and those associated with him got around this without examining why and how they were able to consider that loophole in the first instance. If any of the investigative bodies had the room to review legislation and offer reforming actions, this combined committee did, yet it seems that the investigations and subsequently, the report, became weighed down in untangling the web of information and discerning what happened. Legislative inadequacies and suggestions for reform became dwarfed and lost in the action, so to speak. The investigative process came to resemble that of a criminal prosecution, as opposed to a study of the foreign policy decision making process and legislation. The defendants admitted to many of the facts, yet they denied that their actions had violated valid laws. They claimed that they had simply been carrying out the President's wishes and policies, even if these had been in opposition to the policies of Congress. This became the crux of the problem; who decides in matters of foreign policy? The Tower Report declared in its opening paragraphs that the "is a government of checks and balances, of shared power and responsibility. The Constitution places the President and Congress in dynamic tension. They both cooperate and compete in the making of national policy." However, in the Iran-Contra Affair, the President and his aides had consciously omitted information from Congress and pursued policies that were contrary to the wishes of Congress. This issue is one of great significance, yet no report, no committee, stood up to squarely face it.

References
Harold Hongju Koh The National Security Constitution: sharing power after the Iran-Contra Affair Yale University Press, U.S.A 1990 p6, 16, 18
John Tower, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft The Tower Commission Report: the full text of the President's Special Review Board Random House, New York 1987 pxv,xvii, 4-15
Harold Hongju koh The National Security Constitution p18