'The
Middle Ages' refers to the period of European history from the end
of the Roman Empire in Italy until the Renaissance, i.e. from the 5th
century A.D. until the 15th. Philosophers during this time included
Boethius, Anselm, Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William
of Ockham and many others. During the 12th and 13th centuries
European philosophy was much influenced by the writings of Muslim
philosophers including Avicenna (ibn Sina) and Averroes (ibn Rushd).
Philosophy in the medieval style continued into the late seventeenth
century; Descartes and Leibniz cannot be well understood without some
knowledge of medieval thought. PHIL252 is concerned with medieval
thought from Boethius to Thomas Aquinas, PHIL360 Later Medieval Philosophy[1]
with the period from Duns Scotus, including the medieval elements in
17th century philosophy.
Between
Aristotle (who died in 322 B.C.) and the earliest medieval
philosopher, Boethius (A.D.480-524), a good deal happened of which it
will be useful to have some idea. Greek armies led by Alexander 'the
Great' (died 323 B.C.) overturned the Persian Empire and established
a number of Greek Kingdoms in its territories, which included Egypt,
Palestine, Syria and Asia Minor. The culture of this period is called
'Hellenistic': the Greeks called themselves 'Hellenes'; the 'ist'
suggests that Hellenistic culture was close to but not identical with
Classical Greek culture. In the Hellenistic world Greek was for many
people a second language, Greek culture was something learnt in
school. There was plenty of work for professional teachers of Greek
language, literature, history, philosophy, mathematics, medicine,
astronomy and other branches of science. Many of the teachers had
themselves learnt Greek as a second language. Their writings included
aids for the newcomer to Greek culture: dictionaries, digests,
handbooks, encyclopedias, explanatory commentaries of various sorts.
The city Alexander had founded in Egypt, Alexandria, became an
important centre of Greek culture, with schools and a famous library,
the Museum. Alexandria was especially important as a centre of study
in mathematics, science, medicine and philosophy. Athens continued to
be a centre of philosophy, but not of the sciences.
From
Plato's time there had been opposition between philosophy and
rhetoric—between philosophy, mathematics, science, medicine on
the one hand, and rhetoric and literary studies (poetry, drama,
history) on the other. Except in Alexandria, Hellenistic culture was
in the rhetorical tradition: as was that of ancient Rome, of
Byzantium of Europe until the 12th century, and of the European
Renaissance of the fifteenth century. Greek philosophy and science
was taken up in Islamic countries, and in Europe between the twelfth
and fifteenth centuries.
The
last Greek ruler of Egypt, Cleopatra, died in 30 B.C. By then the
Romans controlled the eastern Mediterranean region, including Greece,
Palestine and Egypt. But Latin did not displace Greek in those
regions. In fact, the Romans themselves had been Hellenized. Educated
Romans learnt Greek and went to Athens and other Greek centres to
complete their education. Latin literature was an imitation of Greek
literature: Latin poetry, drama, history and oratory followed Greek
models. However, there was no Latin counterpart of Greek mathematics,
science and medicine, and not much philosophy. The orator and
politician Cicero wrote a number of interesting and valuable works of
philosophy in Latin which are believed to be based on Greek originals
since lost. In these works Cicero sometimes remarks on the difficulty
of finding Latin equivalents for Greek philosophical terms. Other
writers of philosophical works in Latin were Lucretius and Seneca.
Apart from these three there was little or nothing. During the Roman
period a good deal of philosophy was still written in Greek, some of
it in Rome—by Epictetus, by Plutarch, by the Roman emperor
Marcus Aurelius, and by Plotinus.
In
the Greek-speaking eastern Mediterranean a major event was the
spread of Christianity. Palestine had been included in one of the
Greek Kingdoms established after Alexander's conquests; on the
conflicts between Greek and Jewish culture see the books of the
Maccabees (in R.S.V. Common Bible, (Collins, 1973),
Apocrypha/Deuterocanonical Books, p. 122 ff). The Jewish scriptures
were translated into Greek by Jews living in Alexandria. The
Christian New Testament was written in Greek. Paul, himself a Jew,
travelled throughout the eastern Mediterranean preaching the
Christian gospel in Greek to Greek-speakers, many of them Jews.
Christianity spread rapidly in the Greek-speaking east, and also in
Rome, at first among Greek-speaking residents, later among speakers
of Latin.
Christianity
produced a large literature of its own, some of which is significant
for the history of philosophy in the middle ages, either because it
conveyed Greek philosophical ideas to later Christian readers, or
because its religious content suggested new philosophical questions
or theories. The basic Christian book was the Bible, which consisted
of the Jewish scriptures (called by Christians the 'Old Testament')
together with new Christian books (the 'New Testament'—the four
Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, Letters, and the Book of
Revelation). The rest of the Christian literature of the early
centuries (first to sixth) is called 'Patristic', i.e. 'of the
Fathers' (patres) of the Church ('Fathers' in the sense of
early leaders). The most influential patristic authors included
Athanasius, Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa and
Origen, who wrote in Greek, and Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome and
Gregory 'the Great', who wrote in Latin. (A reference book: Johannes
Quasten, Patrology (Utrecht, 1966 ff), Ref/BR67.Q3.)
Among
Christians 'Trinitarian' and 'Christological' controversies arose
involving Greek philosophical concepts. Concerning Jesus Christ it
was debated whether he was both God and man, whether he had two
natures, how these two natures were related, whether he had a human
soul; and concerning God, how the Christian belief in the divinity of
Christ and the Holy Spirit can be reconciled with the doctrine that
God is one ('one substance'). These questions were discussed at
several 'General' or 'ecumenical' ('world-wide') Councils of
Christian bishops, held at Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus and
Chalcedon. Those who accepted the decision of these councils regarded
themselves as 'orthodox' ('right-teaching') or 'Catholic' ('found
everywhere') and the others as heretics (under various
descriptions—Arians, Nestorians, etc.).[2]
In
324A.D. Constantine became emperor, the first emperor to become a
Christian. He moved the capital of the Roman Empire to the Greek town
of Byzantium, renamed New Rome or Constantinople (now Istanbul). It
is customary to call the medieval empire of the Greeks 'Byzantine'
from the original name of their capital; they called themselves Romaioi,
Romans. The old Rome, and its Senate, Consuls and other magistrates,
kept great prestige, but it was no longer the seat of government. In
fact the Empire had been for a long time too large to be controlled
and protected from one capital; it extended from Britain to Syria,
from the Danube to North Africa. The common language of the eastern
half was Greek, of the western half Latin. Emperors had sometimes
taken colleagues and assigned parts of the Empire to them. In some
places peoples from outside the Empire ('barbarians')—Goths,
Vandals, Huns, Franks etc.—forced their way in or infiltrated.
Sometimes they were employed as mercenaries or auxiliaries, who were
sometimes only nominally subordinate to the Roman Emperor in
Constantinople. Thus in Italy in the fifth century there were western
emperors subordinate to the emperor in Constantinople, but Italy was
in fact controlled by the Goths (who were Arians, heretical
Christians). In A.D. 476 the Goths deposed the last western Roman
emperor (this date is sometimes given as the end of the Roman Empire
and the beginning of the Middle Ages), but continued to profess
allegiance to the Emperor in Constantinople.[3]
The emperor Justinian (A.D.527-565) tried, with some temporary
success, to re-establish control over the west; the 'Gothic Wars'
fought by his generals Belasarius and Narses in Italy devastated the
country and are sometimes said to mark the real beginning of the
'dark ages' in Italy. Justinian (one of the few eastern emperors to
speak Latin) also attempted to re-establish Roman law; his legal
experts prepared a Latin Code of Roman Law, a Digest of
the teachings of the Roman legal writers, and Novels of new
legislation, and Justinian himself wrote (or gave his name to) the Institutes
or introductory textbook.
From
the seventh century the Roman Empire came under attack from the
followers of the prophet Mohammed (died 632A.D.). Islam became the
religion of the middle east, north Africa and part of Spain. Jews,
dissident Christians (heretics) and a few orthodox Christians
continued to live in these countries; knowledge of Greek medicine
gave some of them access to Muslim rulers. The language mainly used
for literary purposes by Muslims was Arabic. Greek medical,
scientific and philosophical writings, including the works of
Aristotle, were translated into Arabic, sometimes by way of
Syriac—some of the translators were Syrian Christians. In 9th
century Baghdad scholars in the 'House of Wisdom', under the Caliph's
patronage, made or corrected translations of Greek, Persian and
Indian writings. In 12th century Spain many of these writings,
together with original works in Arabic, were translated into Latin,
sometimes with the help of Jews who knew Arabic.
See
The Dictionary of the Middle Ages (Ref/D114.D5) articles
'Translation and Translators'; also F.E. Peters Aristotle and the Arabs
(B744.3.P43), pp. 35 ff. and 58 ff.
Meanwhile
in the West, in A.D. 800, the pope had proclaimed Charles 'the
Great' (Charlemagne), King of the Franks, 'Roman Emperor', since
Charles, and not the emperor in Constantinople, was the effective
military protector of Rome. This Roman empire came eventually (in the
10th century) into the possession of the princes of Germany: when an
incumbent died the princes elected a successor, who went to Rome to
be crowned by the pope and then returned to Germany. In practice the
emperor in the west had little authority even in Germany, and the
Kings of France, England and Spain, and many cities in Italy, denied
his claims; in the thirteenth century the popes claimed jurisdiction
over the emperors. Throughout the middle ages there were, then, two
'Roman Empires', one in Constantinople and the other in Germany. The
'Holy Roman Empire of the German People' lasted until it was
abolished by Napoleon; the Roman Empire in the east lasted until the
capture of Constantinople by the Muslim Turks in 1453. The political
and linguistic division between the two empires was a religious
division also; in 1054 the Latin Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches
excommunicated one another.
Charlemagne
presided over a literary revival that modern scholars call the
Carolingian renaissance. See E.S. Duckett, Carolingian Portraits
(Ann Arbor, 1962), DD131.D8, and Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne
(New York, 1951). The language of culture, of the church, and of
bureaucracy was Latin, but for most people in Europe after the
'barbarian invasions' Latin was a foreign language. Charlemagne
encouraged literacy in Latin, his own clergy being helped in this
work by Anglo-Saxon and Irish monks, who had already had to develop
methods of teaching Latin as a second language.[4]
Carolingian scholars made the copies of the Latin classics which the
humanists later discovered. They used an elegant script they had
developed, which the humanists thought was the script used by the
ancient Romans (our lower-case print, still called 'Roman')—the
humanists thought they were discovering texts written by the ancient
Romans themselves and not read during the middle ages, whereas in
fact they were finding texts copied and studied by medieval scholars.
During the 9th-11th centuries pirates from the north (Danes, Vikings,
Norsemen) did considerable damage, but the spread of Latin learning
then resumed. As a result of the Carolingian renaissance, schools
multiplied; at first they were often established in monasteries and
cathedrals, later in many towns. By the twelfth century schools
existed in most of the towns of Italy, France and England. Many
schools were businesses, from which the master made his living out of
students' fees.
Another
movement that historians call a renaissance took place in the
twelfth century. See C.H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century
(Cambridge, Mass., 1955), PA8035.H3. The 'Renaissance of the Twelfth
century' was in part a revival of Greek philosophy. Two things seem
to have produced this movement. The first was an increasing
sophistication in studies of law in Italy, due perhaps to the growth
of commerce. Teachers of law sought out the few extant copies of the Corpus
iuris civilis, the compilation of Roman law made at the
direction of Justinian. More copies were made, and glosses and
increasingly elaborate commentaries were written to help students
through the obscurities of Justinian's corpus.[5]
A law-education industry grew up centred on Bologna. Scholarly and
teaching techniques already worked out in ancient times in the study
of law and other subjects were revived or reinvented in the law
schools and were taken over (or independently developed) in other
schools. These included the gloss (explanations between the lines of
obscure words or phrases, or more elaborate comments in the margin),
the commentary with division of the text ('In the first part he does
so-and-so, in the second part, beginning at "..." he does
such-and-such'), and the question (authorities and arguments on one
side, authorities and arguments on the other side, and solution).
The
second possible cause of the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century was
contact between Latin Christians and Muslims (also with Jews and
Greek-Orthodox Christians). The contact was of course to a large
extent violent, but incidentally Christians formed a favourable
impression of the medicine and material culture of the Muslims and
became curious about their medical and other science. They soon
discovered that the Arabic literature and these fields was based on
translations of Greek writings. In the twelfth century there was a
flood of translations into Latin, first from Arabic and then from
Greek, first of works of medicine, science and astrology, and later
of philosophy. The philosophy did not include Plato, but it included
the treatises of Aristotle, a few of which had long before been
translated by Boethius.
In
some of the larger towns where there were many schools
'universities' were formed. A university was not itself a teaching
institution. It was an association of masters each of whom ran his
own school as a business, getting his income from the fees of
students enrolled in his school. The university approved new masters
and set the curriculum to ensure the reputation of the schools of the
town so as to attract students; it tried to set rents and other
prices, using the bargaining power with the townspeople that masters
had because of the business the schools brought to the town. By the
13th century universities existed in Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and
elsewhere. These urban schools were the public for the new
translations of Greek and Arab philosophy and science, and in turn
the influx of translations attracted more students to the schools.
The Church at first opposed the teaching of Aristotle, but student
demand prevailed and soon the universities made Aristotle's works the
set texts in the Acts curriculum. Although the Church supervised the
universities and the masters and students were all clerics (in a
minimal sense), the teaching was not mainly religious. The most
flourishing schools were in law and medicine ('the lucrative
faculties'); at a time when Paris had over one hundred Arts schools
it had only eight in theology. The study of the law flourished
especially in Italy. It was encouraged by the 'Roman Emperors', i.e.
the German princes who claimed that title, because of the support
Roman law in Justinian's version gave to the Emperor. The law of the
Catholic Church, 'Canon law', was also a flourishing study in the
Italian law schools, encouraged by the pope, whose authority it
reinforced. Philosophy was studied especially in the Arts schools of
Paris and Oxford.
'Medieval'
conveys contempt; to say that some arrangement is 'medieval' is to
express emphatic disapproval. 'Medieval' was a term of disparagement
from the beginning. It was invented in the 15th century by the
Italian humanists, who believed they were bringing about a rebirth (renascentia)
of the ancient and better culture of the Greeks and Romans after a
'middle' or intervening period of barbarism, the dark age. According
to the humanists the ancient Roman Empire had been destroyed by
barbarian invaders such as the Goths and Vandals. The humanists
called the culture of the middle ages 'Gothic' to suggest its
barbarian origin. As indicated above, more recent historians have
found two earlier 'renaissances', the Carolingian renaissance and the
renaissance of the twelfth century; the 'dark age' has now shrunk to
the period between the 'barbarian invasions' and the ninth century.
The
'humanists' were so called because of their study of literae humaniores,
'more humane literature', the studia humanitatis ('of
humanity'). Humanitas was an ancient Roman term with various
meanings, including 'mental cultivation befitting a man, liberal
education, good breeding, elegance of manners or language,
refinement' (Lewis and Short, Latin Dictionary). 'Befitting a
man', suggests a human being fully developed as a human being
should be. The other terms the dictionary uses—'liberal' (i.e.
appropriate to liber, a free man, as distinct from a
slave),'good breeding', 'elegance', 'refinement'—suggest that
the ideal human being is an upper-class gentleman, witty, urbane, at
ease, self-confident, a good conversationalist. Nothing laboured,
pedantic, technical, incompatible with leisure, fitted this ideal.
The literae humaniores therefore did not include the technical
treatises of Aristotle, mathematics, astronomy, law or architecture,
but only genres that a gentleman might practice: speeches, dialogues,
letters, essays, histories, poetry, drama. In recommending the literae
humaniores the humanists meant to contrast their own gentlemanly
studies with the laborious and technical studies of 'the schools'
(i.e. the universities) fit only for pedants and plebeians—law,
medicine, theology and especially Aristotelian philosophy and
science. Philosophy was of course a study for gentlemen, but the
humanists thought it should be carried on in relaxed style in
dialogues, essays or letters, not in laborious 'scholastic' genres
such as the treatise, disputed question or commentary on a text. The
humanists' philosophers were Plato, Cicero and Seneca, not Aristotle.
It
is easy to sympathise with some of the points the humanists were
making: that education should develop the 'humanity' of students,
that it should not be excessively specialised or vocational, that
educated people should be able to discuss in a relaxed and
interesting way a wide range of subjects. On the other hand there are
some subjects that cannot be pursued properly except in a technical
way. The success of the humanist movement was a set-back to
philosophy, mathematics and science (which had begun to develop in
the late medieval schools of philosophy).
In
fact, the humanists themselves had a vocational interest. They or
their pupils sought employment with the Italian cities, and later
with other governments, as secretaries and ambassadors; they could
write letters, write speeches, converse and were better trained for
such things than the graduates of the universities. On one view their
campaign against the education of the schools was an attempt to make
obsolete and unfashionable the 'product' sold in this labour market
by the established 'firms'.
In
another view the contest between humanists and scholastics was
another phase of the battle that had been going on since Plato's time
between philosophy and rhetoric. In his dialogues Gorgias and Phaedrus
Plato had criticised the rhetoricians as being concerned not with
truth but with persuasion. His contemporary, Isocrates, had in
opposition maintained that the study of the art of making speeches
should be at the centre of education. Plato himself, and later
Aristotle and Cicero, had suggested that the true rhetorician will
try to persuade hearers to the truth and must therefore be a student
of the truth. But still there remains a contrast between seeking
truth for the sake of knowledge and understanding and seeking truth
so as to be more persuasive: for that purpose verisimilitude is
better than truth. In the ancient world the rhetorical education
prevailed. In Plato's Academy and in Aristotle's school, the Lyceum,
philosophy, mathematics and science were cultivated together. But
during the Hellenistic period most of the schools taught mainly
rhetoric and other subjects useful to a speechmaker (including some
parts of philosophy). The exception was Alexandria, where all
branches of philosophy, mathematics and science were still
cultivated. In Hellenistic Rome education was rhetorical, and Latin
literature did not include any counterparts of the difficult
treatises studied in Alexandria. At the beginning of the medieval
period Boethius first translated into Latin some of the treatises of
the Alexandrian schools, thereby providing medieval Latins with a
basis from which they could appropriate the rest of the philosophical
and scientific heritage of the Greeks in the twelfth century when it
became available to them from Muslim sources.
The
renaissance humanists, then, were reviving the rhetorical culture of
ancient Rome, studying Latin works written then and the Greek
writings that Cicero and his contemporaries would have read, in
opposition to the more technical Greek writings, oriented to
understanding rather than to persuasion, which had meanwhile become
in translation the basis of education in the medieval universities.
·
The
Renaissance of the 15th century did not for the first time revive
the whole of Greek and Latin culture. Rather, it transferred interest
from the philosophical-scientific culture that had been revived three
hundred years earlier to the literary and rhetorical culture which
had been revived earlier still in the 'Carolingian renaissance' and
then displaced during the renaissance of the twelfth century.
·
For
most branches of technical philosophy the 15th century Renaissance
was a set-back. The gentlemanly genres—dialogue, letter,
essay—imposed by the humanists were less suited to rigorous
thinking than were the scholastic genres of question, treatise and commentary.
·
The
Renaissance did not stimulate the development of science; rather it
transferred attention from science to literature and may even have
been a setback for science.[6]
·
Medieval
Europe was not closed against influence from non-Christian authors.
Muslim and ancient Greek philosophy and science were taken up with enthusiasm.
·
Medieval
culture was not entirely religious and otherworldly. The
universities were business enterprises responding mainly to secular
interest in philosophy, medicine and law with theology a
comparatively minor subject.
·
The
influence of Aristotle's authority over the Scholastics was greatly
exaggerated by their humanist critics. Aristotle's books were at
first opposed by the Church but became university set books because
of student demand. It was always understood that much of Aristotle's
philosophy was at odds with Christianity. And as we will see,
medieval philosophy was much influenced by neo-Platonism.
The
Renaissance humanists spoke of their age of light succeeding a dark
age. The metaphor was taken up again, especially in France, from the
late 17th through the 18th century, the Age of Enlightenment. The
'enlightenment' movement was directed especially against the Catholic
Church and was concerned especially with religious tolerance and
other aspects of what is now called liberalism. (Key events in the
late 17th century were the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the
repression of Huguenot (Calvinist) churches in France, and the
victorious war fought by the Protestant powers of northern Europe led
by William of Orange against France—a conflict still remembered
in northern Ireland.) The philosophes denounced the religious
intolerance of the Catholic Church as medieval and Gothic,
reminiscent of the medieval Inquisition.
Did
freedom of thought exist in the middle ages? Unless it did, at least
in some measure, genuine philosophy can hardly have existed. The
answer seems to be that although in the middle ages freedom of
thought was not acknowledged as a right, it did exist in some
measure, at least in the universities, even in the faculty of
theology. To elaborate: (1) Theologians and canon lawyers held
that Christian belief was for every human being a duty, though
failure to believe (like failure in other duties) might be excused by
invincible ignorance. However, the excuse of ignorance could not be
available to anyone who had once believed: to abandon the Christian
faith after believing it was held to be always wrong and, if
persisted in, deserving of punishment. On the other hand, (2) it
was held that no one who was not a Christian could rightly be coerced
into belief. But (3) non-Christians could not be allowed to try
to convert Christians, and (4) could not be allowed to practice
their religion in public. On these points see Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae 2-2, q. 10 and q. 11.
Point
(1) implies that heretics—that is, persons who had once
been Catholics but have abandoned part or all of the Christian
faith—should be punished. But it was held that to be a heretic
it was not enough to believe a heresy (i.e. a doctrine inconsistent
with Catholic faith); it was necessary also to be 'pertinacious',
i.e. not willing to be corrected. A Catholic who adopted an heretical
opinion but would abandon it if he or she realised it was heretical
was not a heretic. This made freedom of thought possible within
limits: although no Catholic could examine Catholic belief to
decide whether it was true, it was permissible to think about
and discuss questions to which some answers might be heretical
without fear of becoming a heretic: it was enough to be ready to be
corrected. It became customary for authors to make 'protestations' of
readiness to be corrected.[7]
Although
it was not permissible for Christians to examine the Christian faith
and decide that it was not true, it was permissible to construct
arguments addressed to non-believers to show that Christian belief,
or some part of it, was true, and it was also permissible to
criticise and refute such arguments. The obligation was to
believe, not to have arguments. Christianity (like Judaism and Islam)
claimed to be based on revelations from God: that is, adherents
believed that God sent messengers (e.g. the prophets, Jesus) to tell
mankind things they could not have discovered by unaided natural
reasoning—the 'gospel' (good news). Many theologians held that
there were good reasons for believing these messengers, and that it
was possible, once the message was believed, to achieve by reflection
some understanding of its content—perfect understanding only in
the next life, but some understanding even in this life. But no one
was obliged to have good reasons for believing or to attain any
particular level of understanding. The obligation was to believe the
message. A Christian could therefore say, without falling into heresy
or unbelief, that some argument offered to support or explain
Christian belief was unsound.[8]
Thus there was freedom to criticise such arguments as long as it was
not inferred from the failure of some argument that the Christian
faith was not true.
Freedom
of thought was also helped by the fact that philosophy was
recognised as a distinct discipline. The Arts schools taught
philosophy and not religion. The text books were written by
philosophers who had not been Christians. Theologians were Arts
graduates and their writings in theology were full of philosophy (in
fact much of the most interesting philosophy in the middle ages is to
be found in theological works, such as Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae),
but they knew which arguments were based on Christian revelation and
which were based on 'natural reason'. Christian writers sometimes
wrote books in which the arguments were deliberately restricted to
those that natural reason could supply: for instance, Boethius's Consolation
of Philosophy, Saint Anselm's Monologion,[9] Proslogion
and Cur deus homo,[10]
and the first three books of Thomas Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles.[11]
The distinctness of philosophy as a discipline did not mean that
there were two truths; the conclusions of philosophy were expected to
be consistent with the truths of religion. But there was no objection
to saying: 'This is what philosophical reason seems to establish,
though it can't be true since it contradicts the faith'; Ockham and
other 14th century writers sometimes write like this.
Finally,
the teaching methods in the schools and some of the content of the
textbooks encouraged the practice of looking for and trying to
answer objections, including objections to things held by faith.
In the schools one of the main exercises was disputation, the
'question': some of the students would be given the task of defending
some proposition, others the task of objecting to it; after some
debate the master would give his answer and reply to the objections
that had been brought against it. In preparation for the role of
'opponent' senior students would gather a repertory of objections,
the stronger the better. Aristotle's works suggest by example and precept[12]
that opposing views should be carefully examined.
In
the arguments for and against in the first part of a 'question'
there are many quotations from 'authorities', that is writers who
were well regarded in the schools; often the authorities are put in
opposition to one another. However the decision of the question was
not by authority, except on points of faith where the bible and
Church councils were decisive authorities (but not Church fathers or
other theologians—see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae,
part 1, q. 1, art. 8, ad 2). Thomas Aquinas says that authority does
not prove demonstratively but forms an opinion through belief (Quodlibet
3, art. 31, ad 1). He says that in disputations in the schools, of
which the purpose is to achieve understanding, arguments must be used
that get at the root of the truth and show how it is true; if the
master 'determines' the question merely by authorities the hearer can
be certain that the conclusion is correct, but gains no knowledge or
understanding and goes empty away (Quodlibet 4, art. 18).
Thomas Aquinas's teacher, Albert, in reference to a text from Hilary
(one of the Church fathers), wrote: 'Some say that Hilary retracted
these words . . . But since we have not seen his book
of Retractations, it is therefore necessary to bring force to
bear (vim facere) on his words in three
places . . .' (In 3 Sent., d. 15, a. 10). It
was usually possible to adapt an authority to what the writer
regarded as the truth. (The texts above are quoted, and the whole
issue discussed, in M.D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas
(Chicago, 1964), chapter 4.)
Until
the late 17th century higher education in Europe included study of
philosophical writings in the medieval tradition, but during the 18th
century knowledge of medieval thought became uncommon because
medieval culture was regarded with so much contempt.[13]
In the 19th century, however, a revival of interest took place. This
is explained partly by the revival at that time of the Christian
churches, including the Catholic Church; Catholics began to take
pride in their medieval heritage, including scholasticism. In the
late 19th and early 20th centuries, during what was called the
'modernist' crisis, Church authorities made the doctrine of Thomas
Aquinas the basis of instruction in seminaries to prevent too much
compromise with modern philosophical thought. This Catholic revival
of interest led to great advances in knowledge of medieval
thought, though there was some distortion due to modern religious preoccupations.
A
second cause of renewed historical interest in medieval thought was
the change of attitudes to history associated with the Saint-Simonian
movement in France and Hegelianism in Germany. Under the influence of
these movements, historians no longer measured earlier cultures
against their own and pronounced them defective where they were
different; instead, they tried to see each 'period' as an organic
whole and as a necessary stage in the development of human history.
They therefore tried to understand medieval thought 'from within', so
to speak, and without being in too much hurry to pass judgment on
detached bits of it.
During
this century the revival of interest has continued. Religious
reasons for interest in medieval thought have perhaps become less
influential. A lot is now known about a large number of medieval
writers and about the currents of opinion and controversies of those
times. It now seems that there is as much value in the study of
medieval philosophy as there is in the study of Greek philosophy. And
my approach in this course will be the same as it would be in a
course on Greek philosophy: we will read and analyse a selection of
texts with the purpose of understanding and evaluating the arguments,
without being in any hurry to draw general conclusions, either about
the spirit of medieval philosophy or about the philosophical
issues with which the texts are concerned.
·
References
to Plato--e.g. Republic 595a--are by title of dialogue and
"Stephanus number" (corresponding to the pages and
subdivisions of pages ("a", "b" etc.) of the
sixteenth century edition of Plato by Etienne (Stephanus))--in the
example to the text corresponding to Etienne's page 595, subdivision
a. Stephanus numbers will be found down the side (or across the top)
of modern translations.
·
References
to Aristotle--e.g. Physics VIII.6, 259 a4--are by title,
"book" and chapter, and the "Bekker number" found
in the margin of modern translations--in the example to the text
corresponding to page 259, left hand column, line 4, in book VIII
chapter 6 of Aristotle's Physics in the edition of Immanuel Bekker
(Berlin, 1831).
·
The
Bible is referred to by "book", chapter and verse (usually
separated by a colon, sometimes by a full stop; sometimes the chapter
is in small Roman numerals). Thus 1 Cor. 13:4 (or 1 Cor. xiii.4) is
the fourth verse of chapter 13 of the first book called Corinthians.
It reads: "Love is patient and kind; love is not jealous or
boastful". A list of the books of the bible is usually found in
the front of the volume.
·
Other
ancient authors are usually referred to by title, "book"
(a subdivision of what we would call a book, i.e. the work) and
chapter. Often there are two overlapping chapter divisions, long and
short: the long chapter is referred to by small Roman numeral and the
short by Arabic numeral. Thus Augustine, Confessions VII.xii.18
refers to book VII chapter xii or (in the other chapter division)
chapter 18.
·
Reference
conventions for medieval authors will be explained when the need arises.
·
"ff"
means "following"; "cf." means
"compare"; "viz." means "namely".
[1] References to courses and to library holdings relate to Macquarie University.
[2]
The
outcome of the Christological and Trinitarian controversies is
summed up in the so-called Athanasian creed, to be found in the
Anglican Book of Common Prayer: ' . . . there
is one person of the Father, another of the Son: and another of the
Holy Ghost. But the Godhead . . . is all
one . . . So the Father is God, the Son is God, and
the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not three Gods: but one
God . . . our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is
God and Man . . . perfect God, and perfect Man: of a
reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting; equal to the Father, as
touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his
Manhood. Who although he be God and Man: yet he is not two, but one
Christ; One; not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by
taking of the Manhood into God; One altogether, not by confusion of
substance, but by unity of person . . .'
[3]
This
was the situation in Boethius' time. He was Consul and later
Senator in Rome, a Catholic subject of the Catholic emperor in
Constantinople. But he was also for a time an official serving the
Arian Gothic King Theodoric, who ruled Italy from Ravenna (not from
Rome), nominally on the Emperor's behalf. Theodoric eventually
executed Boethius, perhaps because he suspected him of conspiring to
re-establish effective imperial control, or perhaps in retaliation
for the persecution of Arians in the east.
[4]
There
were similar developments later in England at the court of King
Alfred [died 899 A.D.]. Alfred encouraged literacy in the vernacular
[Anglo-Saxon] and personally translated a number of works from Latin,
including Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy.
[5]
Justinian's
work had in fact not been much used in earlier times, and was not
usable until the law teachers of Bologna made it accessible.
'Justinian . . . confidently asserted that no
contradictions would be found which an acute mind could not
reconcile, but there were in truth innumerable
contradictions . . . In later centuries [viz. during
the middle ages] many acute minds were to labour to reconcile these
contradictions, but to the lawyer of his own time the task must have
seemed impossible, and, as we shall see, the Digest was quickly laid
aside'; Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law
(Oxford, 1962), p. 43. 'The great influence of Roman law
derives . . . from the revival which began, as part of
a wider renaissance of learning, at the end of the eleventh century.
The Digest was rediscovered and for the first time thoroughly
mastered . . . The main literary form which this work
took was the note or gloss written in the margin or between the lines
of the text to explain its meaning and to provide the
cross-references and reconciliations without which the work was unusable';
ibid., p. 46 (emphasis added).
[6]
Historians
trace the beginnings of modern science to the fourteenth century
schools, when observation and mathematical analysis were brought to
bear on problems of Aristotle's philosophy of nature (Aristotle's
prestige did not prevent criticism of his theories). Galileo was in
this tradition: 'Here we have a case of a consistent body of teaching
which arises in Oxford, is developed as a tradition by a school of
thinkers in Paris, and is still being taught in Paris at the
beginning of the sixteenth century. It has a continuous history - we
know how this teaching passed into Italy, how it was promulgated in
the universities of the Renaissance, and how Leonardo da Vinci picked
it up, so that some of what were once considered to be remarkable
strokes of modernity, remarkable flashes of genius, in his notebooks,
were in reality transcriptions from fourteenth century Parisian
scholastic writers . . . It is even known fairly
certainly in what edition Galileo read the works of certain writers
belonging to this fourteenth century Parisian school'; Herbert
Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York, 1961),
pp. 8-9.
[7]
For
example: 'I make solemn declaration that in nothing I assert do I
purpose anything against faith, good morals or sound doctrine, or
against the reverence due to the person or office of pope. Should
anything detrimental to any of them be found in my book either
directly or indirectly I wish it to be withdrawn and I want it to be
understood that this declaration applies to each and every
individual argument I advance'; John of Paris, On Royal and Papal Power,
tr. J.A. Watt (Toronto, 1971), pp. 73-4
[8]
In
fact that might be a pious thing to do. After criticising an
argument purporting to show that the world began in time (as
Christians believed) and did not always exist, Thomas Aquinas
comments: 'Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith,
but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to
consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of
faith, should bring forward arguments that are not cogent; for this
would give unbelievers the occasion to ridicule, thinking that on
such grounds we believe the things that are of faith'; Summa theologiae,
1, q.46, art.2.
[9]
The
brothers who asked him to write the book
'prescribed . . . that nothing at all in the
meditation would be argued on Scriptural authority, but
that . . . rational necessity would tersely
prove . . . whatever the conclusion of the distinct
inquiries proved'; Preface to Monologion in Anselm of Canterbury,
vol. 1, tr. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson (New York, 1974), p.3. The Proslogion
is a reworking of the argument of Monologion.
[10]
This
book argues 'by necessary reasons (Christ being put out of sight, as
if nothing had ever been known of him)'; Preface, in A Scholastic
Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, tr. E.R. Fairweather (London, 1956).
[11]
On
the plan of the work see the translator's introduction in St Thomas
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa contra gentiles),
vol. 1, tr. A.C. Pegis (New York, 1955), p. 26 ff.
[12]
'For
those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to
discuss the difficulties well; for . . . it is not
possible to untie a knot of which one does not know.
. . . Hence one should have surveyed all the
difficulties beforehand . . . Further, he who has
heard all the contending arguments, as if they were the parties to a
case, must be in a better position to judge'; Aristotle, Metaphysics,
III.1, 995 a23 - b5.
[13]
In
1819 one of the pioneers of renewed interest in the middle ages,
Henry Hallam, wrote: 'This scholastic philosophy, so famous for
several ages, has since passed away and been
forgotten . . . Few, very few, for a hundred years
past, have broken the repose of the immense works of the
schoolmen . . . Most of their works are unknown to me
except by repute'; A View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages
(London, 11th edition, 1856), p. 426. 'I have found no better guide
than Brucker. But he confesses himself not to have read the original
writings of the scholastics'; ibid., p. 425. In a note added
to a later edition: 'Perhaps I may have imagined the scholastics to
be more forgotten than they really are. Within a short time I have
met with four living English writers who have read parts of Thomas
Aquinas'; ibid., p. 427. Yet Hallam pronounces judgment in no
uncertain terms on these writings that neither he nor anyone else of
his acquaintance really knew: 'But all discovery of truth by means of
these controversies was rendered hopeless by two insurmountable
obstacles, the authority of Aristotle, and that of the church.
Wherever obsequious reverence is substituted for bold inquiry, truth,
if she is not already at hand, will never be attained. The
scholastics did not understand Aristotle, whose original writings
they could not read; but his name was received with implicit
faith . . . The authority of the church did them still
more harm. It has been said, and probably with much truth, that their
metaphysics were injurious to their theology. But I must observe in
return, that their theology was equally injurious to their
metaphysics . . .'; ibid., p. 428.