Medieval Philosophy - Wk.3_

Medieval Intellectual Traditions: Philosophy (2)

13th Century Philosophy: Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

(1) Arguments for the existence of God: From World to God: Cosmological Argument ‘a posteriori’ argument VS ‘a priori’. Cosmological argum. reducible to Ontological?

Aquinas’ ‘Five Ways’ Summa Theol.1,2,1: Question & sub-questions (‘articles’)

The article form - here Part 1, Qn.2, article 1:

(A) Statement of opposing view & arguments

(B) ‘Sed contra..’ & an authoritative quote

(D) Replies to arguments in (A)

‘It seems that God does not exist...: (1) Evil incompatible with infinite good

(2) ‘We have no need of that hypothesis’. But against this: Exod. 3,14...

Reply: It is to be said (‘Dicendum quod...’) .. five ways: from motion... the idea of efficient cause ... possibility and necessity ... grades of being ... order, end-directednes

Ad primum: bringing good out of evil; Ad secundum: nature is not self-explanatory

The Third Way - Argument from Contingency

Argum. in 2 stages (i)to the conclusion that some thing(s) must be necessary; (ii) that one necessary thing is uncaused [to be supplied. ‘Necessity’ here is NOT logical necessity: it means (broadly) being which is imperishable or eternal (cf. Aristot. view about necessary beings)

1 There are things for which it’s possible that they exist or not exist, viz, things subject to generation & corruption (contingent things)

2 It is impossible that everything is like that.

3 If everything were like that then [given infinite time] there would have been a time when nothing existed.

4 In this case, there would be nothing in existence now - since things can begin to exist only in virtue of something already existing [‘ex nihilo nihil fit’]

5 But it’s obviously false that nothing exists now... So:

6 Among existing things there must be some that are necessary (not subject to generation and corruption)...

Second Stage

7 Every necessary being has its being caused by something else or else is uncaused

8 Among necessary beings there must be one that is uncaused (is ‘necessary of itself’) - the supposition that there could be an infinite regress among caused necessary beings fails to explain their existence.

[9 There could be only one uncaused nec. being]

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Assessment: (a) In Stage 1, (3) is problematic...

(b) In Stage 2, the argument against infinite causal regression needs consideration.

(a) The world as perishable

(1) & (3) Þ anything subject to gen. & corr. is non-existent at some time

NOT: There is some time at which everything is non-existent. (cf. Thge ‘all roads lead to Rome’ fallacy)

A counter-claim: See P Geach, Three Philosophers (p.112-115)

“What is .. essential to the ‘Five Ways’ is something tantamount to treating the world as a great big object (... upper limit of the series: Earth, solar system, galaxy, cluster of galaxies..) ...

We may (then) read the third ‘way’ as follows:

Some things are genuinely liable to cease existing. But not everything can be of this character: for then, Aquinas tacitly assumes, a universe entirely composed of perishable things would itself be perishable. ... Now such a universe cannot have always existed.”

Comment. Division & Composition: parts & wholes.... Can one argue validly from:

(A) ‘Each part of the world is perishable’ to (B) ‘The whole world is perishable’......

We have experience of things subject to gen. & corruption (as Aquinas argues). But we don’t have experience of how things are with the world as a whole ....on the contrary, it is plausible to suppose that matter is eternal (imperishable) even if all the particular things that ever come to be are perishable.

(b) The infinite causal regress issue

See: Patterson Brown, “Infinite Causal Regression”, Phil. Review, vol.75, 1966. The objection - derived from Aristotle (eg. Metaphysics,994a) : NOT to infinite regression as such - as in mathematics - or in time (as in the eternity of the world) and in some causal chains.

Aquinas: ‘it is not impossible for a man to be generated by a man to infinity’

The objection is to certain types of causal regress - typically one thing’s being moved by another:

Aquinas: ‘There cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity’ (Sum.Theol. 1, 46, 2, reply to 7).

Part of the difficulty: the background physics & astronomy & the account of causation: the picture is one in which eg, heavenly bodies (eternal, necessary beings) are moved by agent movers (also necessary beings) - but for movement to occur ‘down the line’ in and through caused necessary beings the postulate is that there needs to be an ultimate source of motion (itself unmoved and uncaused).

One difference between Aquinas’ 2 cases: that the causal relation in the second case is transitive:

Cf. ‘A begot B, B begot C...’ NOT: “A begot C” On the other hand:

“the stick moved the stone, the hand moved the stick” Þ ‘the hand moved the stone’ .....

Aquinas’ contention is that causal patterns of this kind must have a stopping point...

Patterson Brown: a quasi-legalistic idea of a cause - where the cause is responsible for the effect ... cf. which car is responsible in a multiple ‘pile-up’?.....

(2) Aquinas’ ethical thought:

Sources: Sum Theol. Pt.II; Summa contra gentes, Bk.3; Commentary of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Key ideas:

* Happiness as the end (point & goal) of human activity and life.. Finis .. telos

* Happiness as (a) constituted by the development of the basic human excellences, the virtues, in the living of a certain form of life related to the development of human capacities & powers as an individual person in a communal context... (natural sense)

(b) in religious framework, happiness as goal/ outcome of the whole of life in eternal life....

(cf. ambiguity in the notion of telos, finis: end, goal, point, purpose)

A ‘Virtue-ethics’ primarily, but presented in a form compatible with a ‘Law-ethics’. The two approaches involve different conceptions of morality & offer scope for opposition: but Aquinas largely avoids this thru’ his account of natural law.

The account holds that we are able to work out morality essentially on the basis of human reasoning and experience - that morality, in its basic character, belongs to the sphere of natural reason & experience - that while morality is critical to living well in the religious sense, what is constitutive of living well is not a matter for faith or revelation.

The basic argument here: morality has to do with human qualities of mind and character and forms of behaviour at which human beings can aim & hope to achieve. But such qualities and forms of behaviour must fall within the scope of human understanding, must be such that we can make sense of them as contributing to human well being; hence morality could not be such as to depend on faith (which has to do with matters that go beyond understanding).

A Naturalistic ethics (?)

The general ‘theory’ is that the cosmos, the whole of nature include. human beings, is governed by divine order, the expression of God’s mind & benevolence - the ‘eternal law’.

Human beings endowed naturally with the power of reason have a share in the divine reason and hence a natural capacity for understanding what reflects good in human life and a natural orientation to appropriate actions for promoting good (marred by the ‘human fall’ - another story). Natural law: not strictly law (as commands) but the expression of the basic goods or values which make for human well-being of which we have a grasp & which we are drawn to seek (given reasonable moral education). This account of ‘natural law’ comes in a theological framework, but it does not presuppose or entail this framework. The essential component is morality as the expression of human reason.

Aquinas’ ethics: as a union of two traditions - Aristotelian ethics (and Stoic ethis in part) and biblical/Augustinian moral outlook. The Aristotelian element is reconceptualised from the Greek world of the Polis to the very different world of medieval Europe and is situated within the religious framework in a way that keeps it as a whole (an ethical standpoint in its own right as distinct from its realization in the religious setting). Aquinas’ development of Aristot. ethics is worked out esp. in relation to Stoic views (eg. the place of the emotions).

Common Ground in the two traditions:

- Human life as having a telos in happiness (fulfilment..)

- The goal as broadly humanistic: the development of human persons thru’ characteristic human capacities and powers in relation to basic goods or values within a framework of common good...

- The necessity of acquiring moral virtue as constitutive of the achievement of human well-being: in particular, virtues of benevolence, justice, truthfulness, courage, self- control - in a life which is expressive of the basic human powers and capacities - knowledge & understanding, social life, friendship, love, aesthetic experience, play, emotional fulfilment, freedom in a political & personal sense...

-The centrality of practical wisdom (Greek: Phronesis; Latin: Prudentia) - the intellectual virtue of knowing what to do for the best in the complex situations of life (not simply a matter of applying general rules...). To be morally good, one needs practical wisdom; on the other hand, practical wisdom in the absence of the moral virtues is mere cleverness (and possibly

dangerous...)

The religious ‘additions’

- Morality, arrived at through human understanding, is expressed in divine law

- There are some specific religious virtues: faith, hope, charity conceived as gifts of God - as grace

- Human action is accordance with virtue merits (in some sense) divine approval ....

- Human action contrary to virtue is sin, deserves punishment, requires forgiveness...

Stoic Ethics

Stoicism: an important movement in Hellenistic Philosophy from early 3rd century (BCE), emerging as the old political order collapsed, & influential well into the early Xian era & beyond.... concerned centrally with shaping personal and political life around the order of the cosmos. The fundamental imperative: to follow the order/law of nature (‘live acc. to nature, live acc. to reason’). Ethics as based in natural law.

Life in harmony with the cosmos: apatheia (lit. ‘without passion’)- spiritual peace as constituting eudaimonia.

The means to the goal: the acquisition of virtue: cardinally, intelligence (as kn. of good and bad), courage (dealing with fear), justice (relations with others), self-control (temperance: esp. control of the passions).

Emphasis on indifference in general to ‘things to be preferred’ such as health, prosperity, property, honour; and indifference esp. in the face of adversity (ill-health, etc). Linked with goal of apatheia: freedom from the passions - the passions seen as problematic, as misguided reactions, confusing what should be indifferent with good or bad.

Strong emphasis on concept of duty bearing on right moral attitudes and forms of behaviour.

General ‘religious/political’ outlook: that all human beings have a common nature, an element of creative divine power, hence virtue is other-regarding but on a world-scale: living so as to promote a ‘world-city’ a political order which reflects the cosmic order.

Scope of discussion of Ethics in Sum.Theol.

- more or less the whole of Part Two (itself in 2 parts)

I-II (First Part of Part Two)

Qns. 1-5: On human action & life as goal-directed ; On the idea of human happiness

Qns.6-21: On aspects of human action: The voluntary and the involuntary

On the will, on motives, intention, choice, deliberation, decision, consent,

on circumstances bearing on moral appraisal of action, enjoyment in action,

on means in action - things used, on acts of the will,

(18-20): on the goodness or badness of human actions in general & in various respects

on acts and their consequences

Qn.22-26: The passions of the soul (a) in general

27-48 Particular passions: Love, Hatred, desire, pleasure, pain or sadness, hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger

Qn.49-54: The various dispositions/ capacities for human acts (the nature of habits etc)

Qn.55-67: ***The virtues (a) in general; (b) partic.. virtues. Nature of virtue, moral & intellectual virtues, Moral virtues & the passions. The variety of moral virtues

The 4 cardinal virtues, the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity);

virtue as lying ‘in a mean’, the ‘unity’ of the virtues

[Qn.68-89] on relig./theological moral qns. esp. sin]

Qn.90-114: On Law - eternal, natural, human, divine law in Judaism & Xianity, the idea of grace

II-II (Second Part of Part Two) - The Major Virtues & Vices in detail -

Qn.1-46: Faith & offences against faith; Hope and failings in hope (despair, presumption) Charity/ Love : its nature, elements etc; & failings: hatred, envy, discord, war etc; Wisdom (and stupidity)

Qn.47-56: Prudence (cf. Phronesis): Practical Wisdom (and failings)

Qn.57-122: Justice & Injustice; Qn.123-139: Fortitude (courage) & related failings..

Qn.140-170: Temperance & related failings; Qn. 171-189: Various aspects of Xian life

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Aquinas on Virtue, Sum Theol. I-II, qn.55, 58,59

(a) Qn. 55: The Nature of Virtue

An ‘internal’ discussion drawing largely on Arist. & Augustinian sources. The social-political world of Athens wh. was the background of Aristotle’s account of the virtues was a world away in a whole range of respects from Europe in the 13th. C. But this does not enter into Aquinas’ consideration. Moreover, he writes in a ‘universal’ vein - as related to a conception of a common human nature; empirically, this can be related to considerations across the Xian world of the time which were shared with Judaism and Islamic cultures (around shared sources & influences).

Art.1

Virtue: a habit - in the category of quality: a disposition for action, involving a developed capacity/ inclination to action of a specified sort or range.

Virtue: a specific perfection of a power. A power is specified in relation to action: a virtue is what makes a power ready for action.

Some natural powers are, in effect, always active in specific ways: eg. digestive system, operation of the heart; or they operate directly such as instincts in animals (birds building nests, etc). Rational powers are not like this: they are open to many possibilities. Moreover, the capacities for their exercise (virtues) need to be developed - hence the idea of habit - something developed thru’ habituation, practice to the point at which it becomes ‘second nature’. So one learns Japanese by studying the language; one learns mathematics by doing (or being got to do) sums, theorems, proofs; one aqcuires the virtue of justice by doing (being got to do) just acts - to the point that one develops a sense of what justice requires (a matter of knowing some general principles and being able to ‘read’ situations) together with the inclination to act accordingly as a matter of free choice. Aquinas: “virtue is nothing other than free choice well applied”

{a developed capacity

Virtue: {inclination to act ....

Art. 2: Virtue is an operative habit: a source of action, involving awareness, choice - hence a habit of mind/ form (rather than matter) - cf. the hylemorphic framework for the classification of virtue. As a power, virtue is a potentiality - but power in an active sense (rather than passive): a developed capacity for action.

Art.3: Virtue is a good habit - its exercise in the nature of the case is ‘for the good’. This is expressed in a metaphysics in which ‘being’ and ‘good’ go together (transcendental ideas), and evil is seen as privation. The general ‘outlook’ is that the development of natural powers to their full potential is a good thing.

What seems needed here is the notion of virtue not simply as a power, but as an ‘excellence’.

Art 4: a definition of virtue (collated from Augustine)

- a good quality of mind, by which one lives rightly, of which no one can make bad use [wh. God works in us without us]

A definition offered around the Arist. 4 causes:

Formal element:: a good quality (specif. a habit)

Material element:: (by analogy) (a) the subject; (b) its field of operation

Final element:: the relevant activity (acting justly, benevolently, truthfully, wisely etc)

Efficient element:: For the ‘theological’ virtues: God (cf. faith: a gift of God....)

For human virtues: habituation, practice, moral education (omitted in text).

Qn. 58: The difference between moral & intell. virtues

Art. 1: that not every virtue is a moral virtue

Aquinas on the etymology of ‘moralis’ / moral from mos: (a) custom (estab. by agreement); (b) a natural or quasi-nat. inclination to behaving in some characteristic way. Aq. suggests that the second sense gives the primary force of ‘moral’ & custom a secondary sense. Inclination to a type of action belongs to the appetitive power of our being: this is the domain of moral virtue. By contrast, the power to speak a language or to solve logical problems (for example) are cognitive powers, qualities of mind, virtues, but not moral virtues.

Art. 2: Moral virtue in contrast with intellectual virtue.

This topic is discussed in the light of the Socratic teaching that moral virtue is essentially a matter of knowledge (a view portrayed by Plato in the early Socratic dialogues; one expression of the idea is the saying ‘no one does wrong knowingly’ - ie, doing wrong is always a matter of ignorance, if you know what is right you will do it. This created a problem in explaining the phenomenon of ‘weakness of will’: that someone could know eg that it’s wrong to steal but do this from time to time. The Socratic defence might be: such a person does not have genuine knowledge; but that sounds, less like a consideration of the evidence, as an argument to save a thesis).

Aquinas’ argument that this rests on a mistaken account of our psyche, specif. in re the way in which reason relates to the appetitive element. If one is healthy, one’s limbs obey one’s mind in effect automatically (‘despotic rule’); but that’s not the way it is with reason and appetites - the analogy here is the political order in which free subjects may be in opposition to the ruler. Socrates, he allows, is right to a point: the person firmly in command of the knowledge of good and bad will not choose the bad, but the passions can cloud reason (etc). What is needed if one to act well?

- knowledge of what to do (intell. virtue) & the developed appetite to act well (moral virtue).

This distinction is argued for further in art. 3. (But is the distinction clear? why not say that moral virtue has two aspects - cognitive & appetitive? Aq. moves in this direction in art.4-5.

Art. 4-5: that moral virtue needs the intell. virtue of prudentia (pract.wisdom) & vice versa.

Moral virtue does not involve various intell. virtues: eg, theoret. wisdom, knowledge, and cognitive skills .. But it does need pract. wisdom (prudence). Why? - bec. moral virtue is a capacity for bringing about good choice - for this one needs the good sense to know what to do in various situations (moral judgment is not a matter of following rules blindly - see art. 5 in this regard). Similarly practical wisdom requires the moral virtues - for in many situations a person will not be in a position to work out what to do to act well without already being disposed to act well by the relevant moral virtue.

Qn59 The moral virtues and the passions (emotions)

Art.1: 3 reasons for holding that virtues (habits as principles of action) are different from passions (movements of the sensitive appetite).

Passions are feelings or emotions wh. in general are accompanied by pleasure or pain - typically, the feelings of joy, sadness, fear, hope, love, hatred, calmness, anger, pity....

Art.2: that moral virtues co-exist with the passions

Aq. discusses this question in terms of the different view between Aristotle (‘Peripatetic school’) and the Stoics. For Arist. moral education is importantly an education of the feelings so that one feelings are appropriate to circumstances (obviously this varies in different cultures): a morally mature person is one who feels love and hate in the right way; we should ‘live according to reason, not according to the passions’ i,e, reason should be in control but in such a way that the passions are given appropriate expression.

The Stoic view (in general) is that the aim is to be free of the passions, to live acc. to reason, detached from the passions. Aquinas goes on to argue that the difference between Stoics and Aristotelians may be more a question of words: if the Stoics are understood to mean that we shoud aim to be free of inordinate passion.

This topic runs on into art. 3 where Aq. argues that feeling sorrow is compatible with being morally good, whereas the Stoics argued that there is no place for sorrow in the life of a wise person. Aq. considers the Stoic view and argues that it is unreasonable: there is a proper place for grief in human life though it can go to excess...

This is an interesting topic wh. could be linked with the very different attitudes which Plato and Aristotle took to Greek tragic drama: Plato was critical of tragedy because he thought that it encouraged emotional displays of fear, pity etc without offering a proper guide to dealing with misfortune in life (to bear suffering with equanimity); Aristotle’s view, is general, was that tragic drama portrayed emotional responses to misfortune (or the threat of it) in illuminating ways.

art.4: the moral virtues are generally concerned with the passions in one or another - but the virtue of justice is an exception (its concern is more directly with how we act)...

art. 5: to go further, moral virtues as a rule do not exist except in conjunction with the passions. (Consideration of Stoic views again).

(3) The Paris Condemnations of 1277

The rise of universities in the13th. century coincided with the emergence in the West of more or less the whole body of Aristotle’s writings and the extensive commentaries on them by Islamic thinkers, esp. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). There was unease about some of these sources, espec. in the University of Paris, from early in the century and embargoes were placed on the use of some the sources from time to time; but open access and use had largely been established by the 1250s. But then a major controversy developed in the University of Paris in the period from the mid-1260s involving the Faculties of Arts and Theology, the Archbishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, and eventually the Pope, John XX1.

The Arts-Theology dispute: reflected in general the challenge of philosophy to theology (and religious belief & authority). Philosophy as relevant here: Aristotle as the major authority & the Islamic commentator Averroes. In part: a conflict of reason and faith; but also in part, a conflict of one authority (Arist/Averroes) against another (the Church & Xian teaching). Study of the dispute was largely neglected until the 19th. century & it remains a question open to further extensive inquiry.

Artists: particular Siger of Brabant, Boetius of Dacia ....

Theologians: Bonaventure (Franciscan) Thomas Aquinas (Dominican).....

The Church: Etienne Tempier, John XXI (a former Paris theologian, Peter of Spain)

Outline: main dates etc

1255 ban on works of Aristotle lifted in Arts faculty in Paris

1265 Siger of Brabant (born c.1238) - Master of Arts c. 1265: committed to Arist. thought & Averroes as commentator as in effect complete in its own right; skilled in argument, & with a will to controversy (?). Common ground between Arts & Theology: metaphysics, Natural Theology eg, existence and nature of God, the eternity of the world (in contrast with creation doctrine); the individuality & immortality of the human soul; determinism Vs. freedom of the will; natural Vs. supernatural goals in human life.

1266-7 Bonaventure preached Lenten sermons in Paris dealing with dangerous, heterdox tendencies in theArts faculty

1269 Thomas Aquinas recalled to Paris by his Order to resume Theology Chair: with a view in part to combatting Siger (esp. on the qn. of ‘mono-psychism’).

1270 The Church in Paris condemns 13 Propositions (1: ‘that the intellect of all men ius numerically one and the same; 5: that the world is eternal’.....)

1272 Aquinas left Paris (the Arts Faculty petitioned his recall)

1272 University statute forbidding Arts teachers to teach theological questions

1273 New series of sermons by Bonaventure on the perils of philosophy, esp. Aristot. phil.

1274 Death of Aquinas & also of Bonaventure

1276 University decree forbidding ‘secret’ teaching....

1277 With some bidding from John XXI, Tempier set up a Commission of theologians in an atmosphere of crisis. The Commission produced a list of 219 propositions, hastily compiled and condemned as unorthodox in a document released by the Archbishop on 7 March 1277 - directed primarily at Siger & Arts associates - but including 20 propositions dealing with ideas found in Thomas Aquinas, ideas seen as offensively Aristotelian/ Averroist by some theologians & the Church authorities.

Siger of Brabant’s teaching career in Paris was ended; Siger was cited to appear before the Inquisition; later in 1277, he & Boetius went to Rome to have the case heard directly by the Roman Curia; Siger was acquitted but was kept in Rome, apparently under some type of ‘house arrest’; he was later killed by his secretary, a demented cleric (?) c.1284.

Dante, Paradiso, (c.1320), Canto X, ‘The Heaven of the Sun’, Thomas Aquinas the speaker:

“This fire, from whom thy glance returns to me,

Shines from a spirit grave in thought, who knew

Sorrow; for him death came too tardily.

That the eternal light of Sigier, who,

Lecturing down in Straw Street, hammered home

Invidious truths, as logic taught him to”

Aspects of the dispute

The dispute pointed in general to tension & conflict between philosophy & theology as distinct claimants to authority & truth. In the context, religious truth was common ground and its ultimacy was accepted by all. At the same time, the appeal to Aristotle and reason were strong - but it is notable that theologians, most significantly by Albert the Great & Thomas Aquinas, had played the major part in developing Arsit. ideas from the 1240s. In that regard, tensions among ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ theologians were also apparent, with the former seeing Aristotle as the enemy, the latter seeing him as offering a framework of (rational) understanding which could be harmonised with religious faith. For Aquinas, in particular, the claims of reason (a) set limits on relig, belief in the sense that belief must not involve contradiction or inconsistency; (b) support faith in providing understanding of God’s world and in developing forms of argument which can be used in theological inquiry; on the other hand he held that, saving the laws of logic and the established range of natural knowledge, philosophy could not lay claim to the whole truth of the universe or presume to reject religious teaching and wisdom.

The idea of ‘double truth’? Acc. to some, one stratagem of the philosophers at the time was to espouse self-contained universes of discourse: in which case, something could be ‘true in philosophy’, eg. that the world is eternal, while something else could be ‘true in theology’, eg. that the world was created in time. This approach was attributed sometimes to Averroes & Siger. But the evidence is not strong; in any case, it would founder quickly on the logical principle of non-contradiction which applies across all ‘truth discourse’. What might be extracted from ‘double truth’ talk , nonethless, is the idea of people seeking to legitimate different approaches to questions, specifically a move on the part of artist-philosophers to mark out a domain of inquiry which they could explore free from the constraints of the religious authorities. In this case, they might have argued that they were exploring Aristotelian ideas not necessarily endorsing them, or that they were dealing with hypotheses or possibilities. (Aquinas gave some support to this approach - his view in regard to the disputed question of the eternity of the world was that (a) on rational grounds, the world might be eternal, that is, it might always have existed and will exist forever while yet owing its being to God; but, again on rational grounds, it is also possible that it came into being in time; and (b) the (actual) truth as revealed in the scriptures is that the world came into existence in time. In regard to the doctrine of ‘mono-psychism’ - that human beings share a single, common Mind (Agent Intellect) - Aquinas relied on contrary philosophical argument, eg. that it could not be ‘squared’ with the evident fact that human beings hold very different views on many questions & that this makes sense only if each individual has an individual mind (etc).

The consequences of the 1277 Condemnation

In very summary terms, there is a good case for thinking that the condemnation ended the dream which had emerged in medieval intellectual life that an effective harmonisation of faith and reason could be achieved. That ambition was to have a long after-life, but the hope was never so real as in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, especially in the command of philosophy and theology, the amazing blend of analytic and synthetic powers of argument, the grasp of ordered detail and the majestic, breathtaking sweep of thought which mark his Summa Theologiae. 1277 marked a re-assertion of Church authority, a certain loss of faith in the powers of reason, and the re-emergence of

fundamentalist thinking. On the other hand, some great medieval thinkers were still to come.

John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, in particular, were thinkers of great and subtle acumen,; but writing on the other side of the 1277 divide, their thought is much less sanguine about the power of reason to deal with matters of faith and theology; in one sense, that approach freed philosophy from its role of ‘handmaid’ to theology, allowing it eventually to develop in its own right or, perhaps more accurately, as ‘underlabourer’ to the natural sciences (in place of theology); in another sense, the separation of philosophy from theology opened the way to mysticism in some quarters, to the hope for a return to a simple biblical theology in other places, or again to a theology of a more dogmatic, unexamined kind proclaimed by eccesiastical authority.

Of course, there are few, if any, absolute beginnings and ends in the history of ideas and institututions. Medieval Aristotelian philosophy, in both direct and indirect forms, continued to play an important role in the emergence and development of the modern world in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; neo-Scholasticism restored the pre-eminence of Thomas Aquinas specifically as a Christian (Catholic) philosopher in the late nineteenth century (but this movement has waned since the 1960s); on the other hand, there has been a more general interest in the twentieth century in Aquinas and other medieval thinkers: Heidegger was greatly influenced especially by Duns Scotus; there has been considerable interest in medieval logic and semantics; the question of universals has returned; and more recently, medieval ethical themes have been revived especially in the context of the virtues and of moral psychology.

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