Medieval
Philosophy: 12th. Century
(P.J.Crittenden)
The
main formative sources of medieval philosophy
* Plato
especially the Timaeus (very little else of Plato was directly
available); and Platonist thought as developed in Neoplatonism
in the early Christian era especially as assimilated into Christian thinking
by Augustine (354-430)
* Aristotle.
The Augustinian/Platonist influence remained significant
throughout the period as a whole as did Aristotle’s logic; but
from the late twelfth century and into the thirteenth century, the
larger body of Aristotle’s writings, inconjucntion with Arabic
commenetaries etc, gradually became available - the works on
metaphysics and the natural sciences, ethics and, later, politics.
These texts came to occupy a central but controversial place in the
Arts curriculum especially in Paris by mid-century, greatly promoted
by Thomas Aquinas and his teacher Albert the Great (1200-80) and
others especially in the Arts faculty (such as Siger of Brabant); but
criticised by many others, especially theologians such as
Bonaventure. Aquinas’ philosophy was Aristotelian in a
fundamental sense - but there is a significant Platonist influence as
well connected especially with Aquinas’ regard for Augustine and
his fundamental enagagement as a Christian theologian.
* Augustine
(354-430). His genius was to develop Judaeo-Christian belief in terms of
Greek philosophy, Plato’s thought espec. in Neoplatonist
form, Aristotelian logic, and Stoic ethics and logic (as mediated by
Cicero) and to present his ideas in a highly personal (almost modern)
way as part of a life-narrative. A. was a teacher of rhetoric, then a
bishop after his conversion to Christianity; his writings cover the
major areas of theology and philosophy:
he wrote extensively on God and the universe, the problem of
evil, freedom and the will, time and history, mind and body,
knowledge, scepticism, language and meaning, faith and reason.
* Boethius
(480-526) : note especially The Consolation of Philosophy ,
much read in the Middle Ages, also his Latin translations of and
commentaries on Aristotle’s logical writings were of immense significance.
The
general framework of Medieval Philosophy:
(a)
Faith and reason.
In
the Christian setting, as in Islam and Judaism, philosophy took its
place in a context structured fundamentally by religious belief and
authority, for the Christian Middle Ages the biblical sources, early
Christian writers, the teachings of Church Councils and Popes (the
Papacy emerged more and more strongly in these centuries). At the
same time, the recognition that philosophy had its own character and
criteria was an important factor in debate and educational practice
over this period. The areas of major focus were logic and semantic
theory, metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind, natural
philosophy, ethical and political theory.
The great hope of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
always subject to dispute and tension, was to establish a fully worked-out
harmony between faith and reason as part of a deep conviction
about the unity of knowledge and truth as a whole. Thomas Aquinas
(1225-74) represents this hope most completely. Perhaps the dream was
already fading by the time of his death in 1274. In any case, three
years later, in 1277, the Bishop of Paris put the whole project in
question in the condemnation of 219 propositions, many of them
relating to philosophical standpoints which were critical to the idea
of philosophy as an independent (or quasi-independent) form of
inquiry. (The condemnation was directed mainly at the views of some
philosophers in the Faculty of Arts, but some of the condemned
propositions can be found in Aquinas’ own writings).
(b)
Cosmos - the world as an ordered whole
Perhaps
the over-riding idea which the medieval world shared with the Greek
world is a sense of the cosmos as ultimately an ordered, hierarchical
totality in which Being - what-is - is one, true, good and beautiful
; together with the conviction that the unity and truth of being can
be grasped adequately, albeit not completely, by the human mind (
which is itself part of the whole) and
that its goodness and beauty is the ultimate object of human
desire and love. Plato’s Phaedrus provides a powerful
expression of this conviction; Aristotle gives a more prosaic version
of the belief in his Metaphysics (esp. Bk 12) and the Nicomachean
Ethics Bk.10. An
approach of this kind does not deny that there is evil of various
kinds, but treats evil as essentially negative in some way, a form of disorder,
consisting in the lack or absence of the appropriate order of being.
In very general terms, Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae
consists of a Christianised version of Aristotelian ideas presented
in a Platonist, or rather Neoplatonist, framework of
‘exitus’ (a ‘going out’) and ‘reditus’(a
return) according to which all things emanate from the ultimate good
in the course of time and return to their source in the fulness of
time (emanation from the Good being understood in the Christian
tradition in terms of creation; note also that the Christian teaching
about eternal punishment leaves the account with an unresolved
problem ie, disorder remains eternally fixed - hence unresolved). The
great medieval poetic version of these ideas, drawing importantly on
Thomas Aquinas, is Dante Alighieri’s poem The Divine Comedy,
written early in the 14th Century.
Survey
of major philosophical thinkers in the medieval period
Note:
in many cases, the dates are approximate only.
9th
Century
John
Scotus Eriugena (800-880) - philosophy, faith and reason; on God and
nature; influenced by earlier Christian Neoplatonist ideas
10th
Century
Al-Farabi
(870-950) (Abu Nasr) - outstanding philosopher, logician &
musician greatly influenced by
Neoplatonism and Aristotelian philosophy; a significant authority in
Arabic thought and in the
Christian medieval world in the 13th C.
11th
Century
Ibn
Sina (980-1037) (Avicenna)
- major Islamic philosopher with a comprehensive metaphysics
and epistemology based on Aristotle & other Greek sources;
a significant influence on
scholastics esp. in 13th C.
Garlandus
Compotista: mid 11thC.;
wrote on topics in dialectic and logic
Berengarius
of Tours (1000-88) - a theologian with a great interest in dialectic
Peter
Damian (1010-1070) - a ‘fundamentalist’ Christian critic
of dialectic and the liberal arts
Anselm
of Bec & Canterbury (1033-1109) - a Benedictine monk, later
Abbot, at Bec in Normandy,
then A’bishop of Canterbury; much influenced by
Augustine and Boethius, he wrote
with originality and clarity on issues in logic and grammar,
the nature of truth, free
will, the existence and nature of God & other issues in theology.
Roscelin
(1050-1120) - taught at various schools in France; his writings have
been lost but he
was a strong anti-realist in re universals
and was especially criticised by Anselm; often
seen as a forerunner of nominalism.
William
of Champeaux (1070-1120) taught logic, grammar, rhetoric, theology
in Paris;
Abelard’s teacher and much criticised by Abelard for his
realist view of
universals.
12th
Century
Peter
Abelard(1079-1142) - ‘Peripateticus Palatinus’ - a major
figure in logic, dialectic and
theology in the first half of the 12th C., significant in the
development of Schools of
learning esp. near Paris, a controversial polemicist in both
philosophy and theology
Bernard
of Clairvaux (1090-1153) - Abbot of Clairvaux, mystical theologian,
major spiritual
leader of the time, an opponent of Abelard in re theological orthodoxy
School
of Chartres
(logic, philosophy, theology, Platonist in character) note especially:
- Thierry of Chartres (taught around 1130-1150) - a
Platonist, wrote widely on the liberal arts
-William of Conches (1080-1154): among other things wrote on
cosmology and cosmogony in a
Platonist vein
- Bernard Silvestris (Bernard of Tours)
(d.before 1178) - wrote an allegorical account of the
origin of the universe (Cosmographia) ; also a
renowned poet.
-
Gilbert of Poitiers (1085-1154) - important thinker in regard to the
place of logic and
dialectic in the discussion of issues in theology (eg, the
nature of God, the Trinity)
Peter
Lombard (1095-1160) - the
‘Master of the Sentences’- author of Liber Sententiarum
(The Book of the Sentences) - a collection of theological
views (‘sentences’ = opinions/
teachings) from the early centuries; a major reference for
subsequent theology students
through to the 16th C.: the Master of Theology degree from
the 13th C. typically took
the form of a ‘Commentary on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard’.
John
of Salisbury (1120-1180) - taught by Abelard in Paris &
Gilbert of Poitiers at Chartres - a
writer of considerable significance on philosophical and
political questions
Ibn
Rushd (1126-1198) (Averroes) - sought to integrate Aristotelian
philosophy with Islamic
thought and to harmonise reason and religion; wrote extensive
commentaries on
Aristotle ; developed
views in metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy
which were particularly influential in the later 13th C.
Aquinas quoted him
fequently - referring to him as ‘the Commentator’
Moses
Maimonides (1135-1204) - the most important of the
medieval Jewish philosophers; best
known work is Guide to the Perplexed, written for
those concerned about conflict
between religious belief and scientific/philosophical ideas;
Maimonides was
frequently quoted by Thomas Aquinas.
Note.
The anonymous but very influential Liber de Causis - The
Book on Causes - was
translated (into Latin) from Arabic towards the end of the
12th C. by Gerard of
Cremona; it related
to Aristotle’s discussion of the nature God in his Metaphysics
(IV)
and was taken to be primarily Aristotelian; in fact it was
based largely on a book on
theology by the 5th. C. Greek Neoplatonist Proclus. Thomas
Aquinas identified its
Platonist origins on the basis of a translation of Proclus
which became available in
1268. The Liber de Causis became a standard text in
the Arts curriculum at Paris from
around 1250 (along with Aristotelian texts etc).
13th
Century
William
of Auxerre (1150-1231) - hisSumma aurea was an early version
of a comprehensive and
systematic work of theology which became common in the 13th
C. (cf. Summa Theologiae)
Robert
Grosseteste (1168-1253) - Chancellor of Oxford in the 1220s, later
Bishop of Lincoln;
belonged to the Augustinian (Neoplatonist) tradition but was
familiar with some of
the Aristotelian sources; was particularly interested in
mathematics and the natural
sciences.
William
of Auvergne (1180-1249) - a major figure in the university of Paris
in the 1230s-40s
in relation to the development of philosophy in the Arts
faculty and as a basis for
graduate studies (especially in theology). Was largely
Neoplatonist in philosophical
outlook but welcomed the Aristotelian movement.
Alexander
of Hales (1185-1245) - ‘Doctor irrefragibilis’ important
figure at the beginning of the
‘golden age’ of
scholasticism; a theologian influenced especially by Aristotle.
William
of Sherwood (1200-1270) - an important logician in mid-13th C.
Albert
the Great (1200-1280) - ‘Doctor universalis’ - the first
major scholastic exponent of
Aristotle’s work in its entirety - wrote extensively in
all areas of philosophy and
theology and just about all fields of medieval knowledge
especially in the natural
sciences. A
member of the Dominican order, he taught Thomas Aquinas.
Roger
Bacon (1214-1292) - ‘Doctor mirabilis’ - English
Franciscan associated with Oxford and
Paris, influenced by the newly available Aristotelian works,
wrote on logic, semantic
theory, and the natural sciences.
Bonaventure
(1217-1274) - ‘Doctor seraphicus’ - studied and taught
mainly at Paris where he
held the Franciscan chair of theology until 1257; then became
minister general of the
Franciscan order (establishing headquarters in Paris and
maintaining an active interest
in academic matters). Influenced especially by Augustinian
Neoplatonism and critical
of the growing influence of Aristotelian ideas especially in
the Faculty of Arts (his
view was that Aristotle’s thought was less amenable than
Platonism to a Christian
standpoint).
Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274) - ‘Doctor angelicus’/‘Doctor
communis’ - a Dominican monk,
teacher for two main periods in the theology faculty at
Paris, wrote prolifically on all
areas of theology and philosophy, strongly influenced by
Aristotelian thought; a
genius for organisation, systematic synthesis & clear and
careful argument combined
(perhaps paradoxically) with a mind of rare depth and originality.
Siger
of Brabant (1235-1284) - a philosopher in the faculty of Arts at
Paris in the 1260s and 70s;
a committed Aristotelian and strongly influenced by Ibn
Rushd, a major figure in the
movement known as ‘radical Aristotelianism’ or
‘Latin Averroism’; some of his opinions
were condemned by the
Church in 1270 and again in the condemnation of 1277 esp. in
connection with the doctrine of monopsychism and the eternity
of the world - this
effectively ended his career.
Boethius
of Dacia - a contemporary of Siger in Arts at Paris in the
1260s-70s, and like Siger an
Aristotelian-Averroist.
Henry
of Ghent (1217-1293) - ‘Doctor solemnis’ - born before
Aquinas and Siger, he became a
major figure after them in Paris from the mid 1270s; was the
leading theologian
between the Aquinas-Bonaventure era and the new
world of the later Franciscan
thinkers Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Defended the
Augustinian-Neoplatonist
tradition but with some Aristotelian elements; he was a
strong essentialist in
metaphysics, a realist
in some
sense in regard to universals.
Matthew
of Aquasparta (1238-1302) -
a Franciscan in the spirit of Bonaventure.
Raymon
Lull (1236-1316) - ‘Doctor illuminatus’ - a self-taught
popular philosopher and
preacher interested in
metaphysics & epistemology; much read in the Renaissance
period.
Giles
of Rome (1243-1316) - ‘Doctor fundatissimus’- a leading
commentator on Aristotle in Paris
in the second half of the 13th C; influenced by Aquinas but
with views of his own in
metaphysics; in political thought, a strong exponent of papal
absolutism, ie, the
subordination of temporal power to spiritual power.
Godfrey
of Fontaines (1250-1309) - studied and taught theology at Paris;
developed a mainly
Aristotelian-type metaphysics
Richard
of Middleton (1249-1302) - ‘Doctor solidus’ - a Franciscan
philosopher and theologian
mainly in the tradition of Bonaventure and critical of
Aquinas in various respects.
James
of Viterbo (1255-1308) - an Augustinian who studied in Paris &
Naples & became bishop
of Naples; mainly in the Augustine-Neoplatonist tradition;
committed to the papalist
view in political theory.
John
of Paris (1260-1306) (John Quidort) - a Dominican theologian at Paris
who defended Thomas
Aquinas against critics; his best known work is in political
philosophy, On
Royal and Papal Power, a defence of the separation of
powers and critical of the
papalist claims.
John
Duns Scotus (1265-1308) - ‘Doctor subtilis’ -
a highly original (and
difficult) thinker from
Scotland, a Franciscan who studied and taught at Oxford and
Paris, one of the towering
figures of the whole scholastic era and of continuing
significance; he died before
completing a revision of his work and his writings have still
not been fully edited. His
philosophical ideas were developed in part in reaction to
Henry of Ghent also to
Thomas Aquinas. Rejected Aquinas’ teaching on analogy,
arguing that univocity is a
condition of knowledge; took a realist view (of a subtle
kind) on universals which at
the same time emphasised particularity; was severely critical
in epistemology of the
Augustinian ‘illumination’ tradition and sought to
ground certitude in self-evident
truths, induction, self-awareness and the immediate grasp of
the intelligible object;
also developed original views on freedom and the will and in ethics.
14th
Century
Dante
Alighieri (1265-1321) - great Italian poet (The Divine Comedy),
interested in
philosophical and scientific issues, Aristotelian &
Neoplatonist in outlook, influenced
significantly by
Aquinas (and perhaps Siger); took an active role in Florence before
being exiled and contributed importantly to political thought
in his work On
Monarchy, a plea for world government as the key to peace
(to offset in part papalist
claims).
Marsilius
of Padua (1275-1342) - taught mainly in Paris, author of The
Defender of the Peace (1324)
a major work in political thought, drawing mainly on Aristotelian
political
theory, and an original defence of the state against the
papal claim to supremacy.
John
of Jandun (1280-1328) - the most thoroughgoing exponent of
Averroistic Aristotelianism,
espousing especially the doctrine of monopsychism (single
active intellect for all).
Meister
Eckhart (1260-1327) - German Dominican mystic who wrote popular work
of a mystical-
spiritual kind but also scholarly academic
work (the latter re-discovered only late in
19th C.)
Walter
Burley (1275-1345) - arts at Oxford, theology at Paris, taught at
Oxford and was active
in public life; mainly Aristotelian in philosophy, critical
of Ockham’s ‘nominalism’.
William
of Ockham (1285-1347) - ‘Venerabilis inceptor’ - major
figure in late medieval
thought, his ideas were especially
influential through to the 16th C. and are of
continuing significance; a Franciscan, he studied and taught
at Oxford, was then
summoned to the papal court at Avignon in 1324 to answer
questions about his
theological views; got involved in a major dispute between
the Pope and the Franciscans,
was excommunicated in 1328 and fled to Munich to the court of Ludwig
of
Bavaria, where he was caught up in the fight against papal
claims and in writing mainly
on political matters. Associated espec. with nominalism, an
anti-realist position
in regard to universals on the lines that generality belongs to the
level of
meaning and only individuals exist (though he allowed that
concepts can be treated as
individuals as grasped by the individual mind); in
conjunction with his metaphysics
and epistemology he made important contributions in some
fields of logic and semantic
theory and political theory; emphasised the unlimited
character of divine omnipotence
together with a powerful defence of the autonomy of reason.
John
Buridan (1295-1358) a major figure in the faculty of Arts in Paris;
contributed significantly
to logic and espoused nominalism in his philosophy.
Nicholas
of Autrecourt (1300-1369) - a radical critic of Aristotelianism and
inductive reasoning;
developed an atomistic metaphysics and an epistemology based
on the direct grasp of
logical principles.
Thomas
Bradwardine (1300-49) - philosopher and theologian at Oxford,
contributed esp. to
logic, mathematics and natural philosophy, and the theology
of free will and grace
Nicholas
Oresme (d.1382) - taught in Paris 1345-60, major exponent of
Aristotle especially in
the natural sciences.
15th
Century
Jean
Gerson (1363-1429) - an Ockhamist theologian, chancellor of the
University of Paris and a
major influence in the 15th & 16th Cs.
John
Capreolus (1380-1444) - leading 15th.C Thomist philosopher and theologian
Nicholas
of Cusa (1401-64) - an eclectic German thinker who drew on most of
the scholastics
from Albert the Great to William of Ockham in developing a
broadly Neoplatonist
approach in metaphysics and epistemology; some of his
speculations are also seen as
prefiguring themes in Leibniz, Kant and Hegel.
Main
topic:
Peter Abelard (a) Notes on the Sic et Non;
(b) on the Power of God
For
references, see Tutorial Guide
Vita.......
(a)
Notes on the Sic et Non & scholastic method
The
Sic et Non (Yes and No)
- writtten probably from the early 1120s and revised and
expanded on occasions; sometimes credited with a major role in the
development of scholastic method of inquiry - especially the
disputation; others suggest that it was less original and less
influential in any direct sense. The work consists of a collection of
texts from the Scriptures and Church Fathers relating to some 150
topics or questions, the texts on each topic being arranged in two
opposed or contradictory groups (Yes ... No ...: For & Against).
The collection is preceded by a short preface which sets out the
purpose of the collection and gives some rules for considering the
texts and their relationships, e.g.
1
That faith is to be supported by reason, and against
32
That to God all things are possible, and not
44
That God alone is incorporeal, and not
154
That lying is permissible, and against
157
That killing is lawful, and not.
Abelard
took the texts from various other collections - Florilegia ,
dictionaries of quotations - & then collated them into the
oppositional structure, yielding a text of a different sort. The work
has been interpreted at times as sceptical in intent, as an assault
on Church authority, with Abelard portrayed as a medieval
rationalist, free -thinker, the opponent of authority in the name of
reason. But this is not really consistent with what Abelard says in
the Preface or with his theological writings in general: he had
definite views & sought to exercise reason in thinking about
theological matters, but was concerned to be orthodox; also, there
are similar collections in other areas, notably in Church law,
- legal decrees etc in mutual opposition:
probably intended in part for the reform of Canon Law &
for training lawyers. The Sic et Non could be seen as a
sourcebook for training theology students and a convenient collection
for Abelard to refer to in writing on theology.
In
general, Abelard thought it important to reconcile differing opinions
in the Scriptures because of their claim to be accepted by faith;
with patristic writings, one has more leeway...
The
Preface of Sic et Non indicates
several ways in which the reconciliation/ harmonisation of
conflicting statements might be effected, drawing on logical skills
to maximise consistency in the sources.
Among general rules:
*
be on the look-out for false inscriptions or headings
*
take note of textual corruptions, scribal errors
*
take note of authorial retractations, changes of opinion (eg. Augustine)
*
check for embedded quotations
*
take account of the context and purpose of the texts
*
look out for ambiguities and possible changes of meaning
*
where harominsation is not possible: compare
the views and choose the one with the
strongest aupport and best confirmation.
Abelard’s
general attitude & purpose: “Dubitando enim ad
inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo veritatem percipimus” - doubt
leads to inquiry, inquiry to truth:
a primer in detective-type procedures rather than an
expression of scepticism or an attack on authority. Perhaps more than
anything, the text suggests Abelard’s great (over-)confidence in
the power of reason to solve problems.
E.Gilson : “The method of the Sic et Non
would pass completely into the Summa Theologiae of St.
Thomas where each question begins by setting up opposing authorities
and then seeks resolution ...”. On the other hand, many would
argue that the later medieval form of Disputation is considerably
more complex & that the Sic et Non was
not a major factor in its development.
(b)
Abelard: ‘That God can do only what He does do’
Excerpt
in Course Text from the Theologia Scholarium -
a late work.
For
secondary sources, see: J. Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter
Abelard, ch. 9, p.216-225
A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford, 1979, p.110-116
The
topic - the power of God, divine omnipotence - was an issue of major
concern at the time & Abelard had already discussed it in a
number of earlier sources (and assembled texts on the topic in the Sic
et Non).
It
is linked with the central Christian doctrine of the Trinity: God as
Father Son & Spirit as relating to the power, the wisdom &
the goodness of God. Each of these divine attributes raises questions
of an ethical kind & bear on Abelard’s writing on ethics as
well as in theology.
Power:
could God do more or better things than he does?
Wisdom:
if God has
foreknowledge of all things how is free will possible?
Goodness:
if
God is supremely good why is there evil in the world?
Theologians,
including Abelard, all agreed that God is omnipotent & that
whatever God does is good; but they differed as to what omnipotence
involved - how it should be defined - & about its implications
for divine goodness. Again, there was agreement that God’s power
did not include the power to sin (do wrong): but this was not seen as
a limit on his power since to sin is to fail to act well & the
power to fail in action is the opposite of omnipotence. (Kenny,
p.110, notes that one could say ‘God can do wicked things if he
wishes’ - but the truth of this conditional statement as a whole
depends on the false (because impossible) status of its two parts; it could
be compared, eg, with ‘if a man is a donkey he has four legs’.
The
primary focus:
could God do otherwise than he does? (is he free to do otherwise?).
To
this question, Abelard replies ‘No’ - God cannot do
otherwise than he does: it is necessary that he does what he does
& not do what he does not do. As Marenbon notes, A. discussed
this question in a number of writings, re-writing it finally for the Theol.
Scol. His starting point is the premiss that God does nothing
which is not good; note the form of the question re God’s power:
whether he could do more or better things than he does?
In
taking this view, Abelard went against the general theological
consensus: he was well aware of this, noting that “I consider
that God can do only what he does do, even though this opinion of
ours has few if any supporters and may seem to be in conflict with
what has been said by many holy men and to some extent to be at odds
with reason itself” (Th.Scol. 519). His view was in fact
fiercely attacked, notably by Bernard of Clairvaux, and the following
was among the “Errors of Peter Abelard” condemned
at the Council of Sens in 1140:
“God can act or refrain from acting only in the manner and at
the time that he actually does act and refrain from acting, and in no
other way”.
Abelard
arrived at his view on the basis of a definition of omnipotence
which he took from Augustine to the effect that to say that God is
omnipotent is to say that he can do whatever he wants to do (potest
efficere quidquid vult). (This is contrast with the more
standard definition according to which God can do everything, or: God
can do whatever is (logically) possible).
Abelard’s
Argument: Summary
(see text)
Abelard’s
position is expressed succinctly in the final paragraph:
The foregoing arguments and resolutions of objections make
it clear to all, I think, that God can do or omit doing only those
things which he does do or omit, and he can do them or omit them only
in the way or at the time that he does and not at any other.
The
question:
can God do more or better things than he does or refrain from doing
what he does?
There
are difficulties, Abelard says, whichever way one answers this question.
(A)
If yes ie. if God can do otherwise, then problems arise in
regard to his goodness. The
agreed starting-point is that:
*God can do only good things and things which it is fitting
for him to do
* God can omit doing something only if it is fitting or good
for him to omit doing it.
Next,
it is clear that good and bad are contraries (opposites); hence:
If something is good to do then it would be bad to omit doing it.
That is,
It would be bad for God to omit to do what it is good for him
to do or what he should do
- noting, in addition, that God acts effortlessly.
We
can therefore say:
For whatever God
does or omits to do,
there is a right and valid reason.
Someone
may put an opposing view as follows:
Whatever God does is good; suppose that he does X, then X is
good; but suppose that
instead of doing X he did Y, then Y would be equally good.
Does God act without reason
in doing X rather than Y? No -
given that it is not required that both X and Y be done &
that to do X or Y is equally
good, then whichever action God did, X or Y, it would have
been done with reason.
But
Abelard objects that the reasoning here is not satisfactory:
On the supposition envisaged, Y was a good thing to do &
there was valid reason for
doing it; in that case, doing Y was just as much required as
doing X. Not to do Y in
that
case would be for God not to act sensibly.
What
of the rejoinder that it would have been good to do Y only if God
omitted doing X? - clearly that won’t work, for by parity of
reasoning God would be acting badly if he were to omit to do X. The
only way out is to acknowledge that:
God can do only what he does do & omit only what he does omit.
Kenny,
p.110: summarises the case against the ‘yes’ answer (in re
an earlier text):
“if
God can make more and better things than those he has made, is he
not mean not to do so: after all it costs him no effort! Whatever he
does or refrains from doing is done or left undone for the best
possible reasons, however hidden from us these may be. Whatever he
has done has been right and just: hence it would be unjust for him to
have left it undone. So it seems that God cannot act except in the
way that has in fact acted”.
(B)
On the other hand, if one answers No to the qn., then one has to deal
with other arguments and the opposition of the (Church) authorities.
To see the problem, consider a person, P, who is going to be damned;
and keep in mind (as a matter of general agreement) that, with
God’s help, a person who is in fact going to be damned could be
saved. Now:
If P who is going to be damned cannot at all be saved then he
cannot do what he needs to
do to be saved. In that case, P cannot be rightly accused or
blamed for not doing those
things which he was unable to do. [So it must be possible for
P to do what he needs to do]
But if P were able to be saved with God’s help by doing
what he needs to do, then it is
surely true that God is able to save P even though this is
not going to happen.
*If it is possible for P to be saved by God, then it must be
possible for God to save P.
In other words, God can do what he is no way going to do
* Hence, the
opinion that God cannot do otherwise than he does is false.
Kenny’s
summary (p.110-111) of the case against the
‘No’ answer:
“If
we take any sinner on his way to damnation, it is clear that he
could be better than he is: for if not, he is not to be blamed, still
less damned, for his sins. We know, that is, that it is true to say
of him:
This sinner can be saved by God
We
also know that:
This sinner will be saved by God if and only if God saves
this sinner.
So
surely we can conclude:
God can save this sinner.”
Having
set out the difficulties for each case, Abelard opts for the view
that God cannot do otherwise than he does (cannot do more or
better things) even though it is a minority view & is much criticised.
The opposition says that his view detracts from God’s
excellence and seems to make God less powerful than human beings
given that we have the power to act otherwise than we in fact do (eg,
I am standing now but I could be sitting down).
Abelard’s
reply: having the power
to act otherwise is a really a sign of weakness, as with a range of
other human abilities including the ability to sin.
Things would be better if we could only do the things we should do -
God allows us the power to sin to show his own power and goodness. In
contrast with us, God,
in not being able to do other than he does, does everything that he
could or should do, everything that is good and fitting (& vice
versa for what he refrains from doing).
Note that this appears to commit Abelard to the view, later
to be associated famously with the 17th century philosopher and
mathematician Leibniz, that this world is the best of all possible worlds.
What
of the objection in (B) above that God could save the sinner who is
going to be damned?
Abelard
replies to this by criticising the account of possibility to
which it appeals; specifically, he criticises the move from:
(a)
‘P could be saved by God’
to
(b) ‘it
is possible for God to save P”
[Note:
in Logic, statements about possibility and necessity are called modal
propositions; Abelard made significant contributions to this
branch of logic - Modal Logic - but that is not to say that he was
right on this occasion].
His
approach is to provide counter-examples, eg, a sound may be audible,
though there is no-one to hear it; a field can be tilled by someone
without it being true that there is someone who can till it; etc.
The following proposition is true:
A sound is heard by someone if & only if someone hears it.
But
the following ‘possibility’ proposition is false:
It is possible for a sound to be heard by someone if &
only if it is possible for someone to
hear the sound
(suppose
that no non-deaf person is in the vicinity).
With
regard to (a) above:
the possibility that P could be saved by God is a possibility to be
referred back, Abelard says, to a capacity of human nature: it
simply says that being saved is a human possibility (“human
nature does not reject this, namely that it be saved”).
With
regard to (b) above:
this is different from (a) because in this case the possibility is
to be referred back to “the nature of divinity so that we
mean that the nature of God does not reject saving him”. But
this is false, Abelard says, for it is incompatible with God’s
nature to do anything that it is not fitting for him to do.
Abelard’s gen. principle is that it would be a bad thing for God
not to save a person if he could; but he argues that it is
fitting that someone who deserves to be damned is damned, and since
God does only what it fitting, he must damn anyone who merits damnation.
For
a parallel example, Abelard notes that the the following two
statements say the same:
‘The judge punishes this person’
&
‘This person is punished by the judge’
But
the related propositions (c) and (d) have different force & do
not necessarily go together:
(c)
‘It is right for the judge to punish the person’
(d)‘It
is right for the person to be punished by the judge’
The
meaning of (c) is that the judge ought to do this according to the law;
whereas the meaning of (d) is that the person deserves to be punished.
These two can come apart: eg, a person may in fact be innocent and
not deserve punishment, yet be deemed at fault on the evidence
available in law (the evidence by which the judge is bound).
In
bringing the discussion to an end,
Abelard deals with two objections:
(i)he
is concerned to show that, although God could not do otherwise in
his providence and will, this does not entail that whatever happens
in the world happens necessarily. His response is that what God does
(what he wills, what he foresees..) relates to possibility so far as
concerns divine nature; whereas
what happens in the world
relates to possibility as concerns created things (which are
contingent, not necessary, in their way of being).
(ii)
The second objection that, if his account is correct, then God
deserves no thanks since he cannot do other than he does and that he
acts as if under compulsion.
Not
at all, he replies. The
nature or necessity of God’s goodness cannot be separated from
his will: he wills
whatever he does and he is free precisely in willing what he does as
the expression of his nature. God thus has what is called
‘liberty of spontaneity’ - what he does he does ‘of
his own will’ not contrary to his will or as if compelled by
some other force. Admittedly, he does not have ‘liberty of
indifference’ - that is, freedom to do other than he does; but
Abelard holds that this is not necessary for freedom and, as he has
already argued, the power to do otherwise is really a sign of
weakness, hence not to attributed to God. Of his goodness, God acts
“not in an unwilling way but spontaneously”; we thus have
every reason for gratitude. (For a ‘human’ comparison:
a compassionate person will, inevitably, help someone in
distress; but that is not a reason for not being grateful to them).
Conclusion:
see final paragraph as quoted above at the beginning of this summary.
Abelard’s
Argument: Assessment
Kenny
(p.112) comments that “Abelard’s discussion is an
astonishing exhibition of dialectical brilliance, introducing or
reinventing a number of distinctions which are of great importance in
modal logic and ther logic of ability” - but he argues that his
stance here rests on an
unsatisfactory account of omnipotence and collapses quickly.
(a)
Omnipotence and Freedom
As
noted, Abelard adopts a definition of omnipotence acc. to which
God can do whatever he wants to do (potest efficere
quidquid vult) (in contrast with: God can do whatever is possible).
The objection is that, the ability to do what one desires is
not sufficient for omnipotence since, on Abelard’s account, any
finite person - someone with limited powers - would be omnipotent
provided he limits his desires to what he is able to do!
Furthermore,
Abelard’s dismissal of the need for ‘liberty of
indifference’ is open to question: specifically, the attribution
of desires presupposes a being with the ability to (choose to) do
otherwise than they do; if so, “Abelard’s God lacks not
only omnipotence but also the power of voluntary actions: lacking
that, he cannot be a person at all” (p.113).
(In effect Abelard adopts a compatibilist view of
divine freedom: God acts of necessity but this is compatible with his
acting freely since he wills what he does. David Hume gave a
compatibilist account of human free will and various versions of
compatibilism are still around).
As noted, Abelard’s view was condemned at the Council of Sens in
1140 & the opposing view - that God can act otherwise than he
does act - has been the accepted Christian teaching.
The best known defence of this view, to the effect that God
can act otherwise than he does and that God can only do what
is fitting and just, was given by Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Part I, question 25 (‘On divine power’),
article 5 ‘Whether God is able to do what he does not do’.
This is a complex argument in its own right; but Aquinas’
position in general is that whatever God has done is fitting and
just in the actual world; this allows that there could be other
and better possible worlds which God could have made - but whatever
world is actual, the general principle holds true. Aquinas thus
rejects the Abelardian and Leibnizian view that the actual world is
the best of all possible worlds. Could God act in a better way than
he has (where ‘better’ is an adverb relating to God’s
action)? - Aquinas’s answer is no (whatever God does he does in
the wisest and best possible way). But could God act in a way that
the world he makes is better (where ‘better’ is an
adjective relating to the condition of the world)? Aquinas answers:
not so far as the general natures of actual created things are
concerned, though he may have made different types of things (eg
rational creatures vastly superior to human beings: eg, a race of
superpersons); but, yes insofar as the properties and behaviour of
specific beings are concerned: eg, any human being could be a better
person &, if so, the world would be a better world. In these
terms, the actual world is far from the best of all possible worlds.
(b)
Abelard’s discussion of possibility (in this argument)
In
dealing with the case of the person who could be saved though in fact
they won’t be, Abelard says that the possibility that P could be
saved by God is a possibility to be referred back to a capacity of
human nature: it simply says that being saved is a human
possibility (“human nature does not reject this, namely that it
be saved”).
In
dealing with possibility, Abelard analyses examples such as the following:
It is possible for a standing person to be sitting down
This
can be interpreted as a true statement in a divided (or de re)
sense:
(1)
A standing person can be sitting at some time
Or
it could be taken as a false statement in a compound (or de dicto)
sense:
(2)
It is possible for a standing person to sit while remaining standing
In
logical form (but without logical notation), (1) is analysed as (3)
& (2) as (4)
(True)
(3)
There is someone who is standing and it is possible that he
is sitting
(False)
(4)
It is possible that someone is standing and sitting
Marenbon,
who discusses the issues here at some length (p.223ff), notes that
Abelard was reluctant to accept the analysis of (1) as (3).
What he does at this point is to invoke an unanalyed notion
of ‘possibility for’ as in the original statement.
In the account, what is possible for a particular
thing is determined by listing the properties a being
of the kind it is may have or not have. So a particular human
being may have any property which “human nature does not
reject” . Having two legs and being able to walk, for example,
is such a property: on this view, as Marenbon comments, “it will
be possible for a man whose legs have been amputated to walk
.. and indeed for him to run a mile in 200 seconds, even if (as a
matter of fact) no one will ever succeed in running so fast”
(p.223). In opting here for a ‘possible for’
analysis Abelard does not go on to consider how this would translate
in to ‘possible that’ terms where one is called on
to consider, not generic possibility, but possibility that takes
account of synchronic possibilities. In short, it is clear that it is
not possible that a person whose legs have been amputated could,
in that condition , walk or run a mile.
On his ‘possible for’ account, Abelard holds
that it is possible for P, a person who will be damned, to be saved.
But this seems to say no more that P is a human being and
being saved is a condition compatible with being human (a generic
possibility) - though, on the Abelardian hypothesis, it is not
possible that P will be saved (any more than it is possible that a
person without legs will walk).
As Marenbon suggests, this solution to the problem of
determinism (which relates to whether P is free and hence culpable)
may seem to be verbal subterfuge. The standard theological response
to Abelard would be to analyse the possibility of P’s being
saved, not merely in
generic terms, but with reference to P’s actual powers - that it
is possible that he will choose to do good rather than evil, hence it
is possible up to the point of final choice that he be saved; that he
will in fact be damned arises
from his choice not from divine determinism.
(c)
Abelard’s view of what is right and good
As
we have seen, Abelard opted for the view that God could not do other
than he does on the grounds that this was the only way of ensuring
his goodness. (see discussion of option (A) above).
This involves the (reasonable) view that goodness cannot be
defined simply in terms of God’s will: if we are to say that
what God does is good, then we need an independent criterion of
goodness. But Abelard combines this with the view that for any given
person, at any given point, there is a single action which is the
right and obligatory thing to do if the agent is to be morally
good. This is in contrast with the view that, in many situations,
there are various things a person should not do if they are to act
well but also a range of things which theperson might do any one
of which would be morally good (though some may be better than others).
The ‘single right action’ view is upheld in modern ethics
by Utilitarian theorists on the lines that the single right action is
the one which leads to ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest
possible number’ (working out which one that is is another matter!).
The ‘range of morally good actions’ view is more
common in the Greek and Christian traditions.
Abelard assumes without argument that the ‘single right
action’ view is correct and hence must be applied to God.
He holds that God cannot do wrong and that at any point there
is a single right action: it follows that God could not do otherwise
than he does. But this
depends on ‘the single right action’ assumption. Suppose
one holds (as in the other view) that there are various equally good
things, X,Y, Z, which
God could do: then he acts well in doing X, but he would have acted
equally well had he chosen to do Y (etc).
(Attributions
of actions to God involve temporal references and raise issues about
God’s supposed immutability; this is too complex an issue to
deal with here but Abelard was well aware of the problems and deals
with them on the basis of various logical distinctions; the main
contention is that God’s power is eternal and unchangeable, but
the exercise of the power in terms of its taking effect will be at
different times).